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ABSTRACT 
It is well known that aging affects fluid cognitive processes while leaving 
crystallized processes largely intact. When it comes to language abilities, figurative 
language tends to be more associated with fluid abilities and literal language with more 
crystallized abilities. Fluid abilities involve short-term storage of information and mental 
manipulation, which are associated with metaphor interpretation. Eighty participants (40 
adults over fifty years old, and 40 young adults) completed the Metaphor Interpretation 
Test (Iskandar & Baird, 2013). The test includes 17 items chosen from a list of metaphors 
by Katz et al. (1988). Answers were coded as abstract complete (AC), abstract partial 
(AP), concrete (CT), or other/unrelated (OT) response. On a multiple choice version of 
the test, each option represented one of these categories. Participants also completed 
cognitive tests measuring estimated verbal IQ, short-term memory, working memory, 
processing speed, mental flexibility, verbal abstraction, and visual abstraction. Overall, 
younger adults produced a greater number of and chose more AC responses on free and 
multiple-choice formats of the test, respectively, than older adults. Conversely, older 
adults produced a greater number of and chose more CT responses on free and multiple-
choice formats, respectively, than younger adults. Several measures were associated with 
aspects of performance on the Metaphor Interpretation Test Verbal short-term memory 
span most often emerged as a predictor in these analyses.  Co-varying on verbal short-
term memory span eliminated age-group effects, while co-varying on estimated verbal IQ 
increased age group differences. Results suggest that aging adversely affects novel 
metaphor interpretation through age-related limitations in the ability to hold information 
in mind long enough to search for and link similar cognitive networks.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
In fields emphasizing technical writing, researchers are encouraged to be as literal 
as possible in describing and explaining natural phenomena.  In the course of daily life, 
however, we often use figurative language that leaves much room for interpretation. 
Figurative language usages linking physical sensations with abstract concepts, such as 
credit freeze, credit squeeze, and credit crunch were dominant in the 20th century 
(Glucksberg, 2011). In fact the term credit crunch was used in over 400 New York Times 
articles published between 1981 and 2008 (Ahmad, 2011). Not until recently has 
cognitive neuropsychology focused on brain areas and functions that relate to the 
understanding and production of figurative language rather than literal language. The 
study of metaphorical thinking as related to other cognitive functions is becoming more 
popular as computer models become more sophisticated, neuropsychological cases of 
impaired metaphorical processing arise, and different styles of interpreting metaphors are 
found.  
In the present study, an expansion of this research area was attempted by assessing how 
responses on a newly-created English-language test of metaphorical processing with free 
response and multiple choice components (Iskandar & Baird, 2013) were associated with 
performance on clinical neuropsychological tasks tapping working memory, visual 
abstraction, verbal abstraction, processing speed, and attention switching in older and 
younger adults. Iskandar and Baird  showed that the success of university students in 
providing abstract interpretations of metaphors was associated with   working memory, 
presumably reflecting the respondent’s capacity to  hold information on-line long enough 
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for a semantic comparison or link to be made. The purpose of the present study was  to 
build on these findings and consolidate them with work showing that older adults tend to 
exhibit difficulties with complex and ambiguous language comprehension more generally 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Just & Carpenter, 1992), and with abstract thinking in figurative 
language specifically (Nippold, Uhden, & Schwarz, 1997; Uekermann, Thoma, and 
Daum (2008). 
What Are Metaphors?1 
A metaphor can be defined in several ways. The term metaphor comes from the 
Greek metapherein, which means to transfer (Gove, 1966). The etymology of the word is 
in itself interesting in that it implies that a property of one item is conceptually 
transferred to another. In philosophy, the classical view of metaphors is that “a metaphor 
is an elliptical simile useful for stylistic, rhetorical, and didactic purposes, but which can 
be translated into a literal paraphrase without any loss of cognitive content” (Johnson, 
1981, p. 4). This view of metaphor dismisses it as a linguistic tool that can enhance 
understanding, but that is easily replaceable by an alternative literal statement such as a 
simile. Similarly, according to traditional psycholinguistic models (see Ortony, 1993), a 
metaphor is construed as a similarity between a vehicle and a topic. That is, in a metaphor 
such as love is a battlefield1, battlefield is the vehicle and love is the topic. The similarity 
that the reader infers between these two concepts is the ground on which the metaphor is 
based.  
These models fail to take into account what seems to be the most important role 
of metaphors:  metaphors link disjointed domains of experience; a role which was 
                                                 
1  Note. Throughout this document, common metaphors  are typed in italics, whereas original metaphors are 
cited in quotation marks with the source and page number. 
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highlighted in the etymology of the word and has resurfaced in more modern cognitive 
linguistic models Dent-Read and Szokolszky (1993) argued that metaphorical processing 
involves “seeing or understanding one kind of thing as if it were a different kind of thing 
and that this process is fundamentally perceptual” (p. 227). This indicates that 
metaphorical processing involves an integration of language information with perceptual 
experiences. Dent-Reed and Szokolszky believed that the scope of metaphor can be 
expressed and understood in action and pictures as well as language. For example, one 
can make one’s fingers walk and the headlights of a car can be seen as eyes.  
Additionally, metaphors can be interpreted differently in different languages. For 
example “Carloè un coniglio,” a metaphor used in an Italian study (Papagno & Vallar, 
2001), literally means “Charles is a rabbit” (p. 516) but metaphorically means that he is a 
coward. In other languages, it may be interpreted as him being promiscuous or quick. On 
the other hand, university students with English as a Second Language (ESL) show the 
same level of cognitive sophistication in metaphor interpretation as native English 
speakers despite scoring lower on academic measures of English proficiency (Johnson & 
Rosano, 1993). That is, metaphors may enhance understanding for ESL students.  
A metaphor also can be defined through its function. That is, metaphors function 
as bridges (metaphorically speaking) between two concepts and create new ideas that 
transcend what these concepts mean individually (Muran & DiGuiseppe, 1990). Muran 
and DiGuiseppe posit that metaphors have several necessary properties including novelty, 
incongruity, similarity, relation, and integration. From a neuropsychological perspective, 
metaphorical processing depends on more than an intact language system. It also requires 
“higher order” abilities through which one views language in relation to previous 
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knowledge, the context of the conversation, and social cues from the co-conversant or 
author (Martin & McDonald, 2003). These abilities also involve integrating information 
from various cognitive and at times sensory-perceptual domains to generate novel 
inferences about what is meant. This may also be related to the neuropsychological 
process of concept formation, which is defined as the ability to integrate seemingly 
dissimilar stimuli and acquire a common response to both (Kendler, 1961; Sweetland & 
Childs-Quay, 1957). According to Schnitzer and Pedreira (2005), an explicit metaphor of 
the form “X is (a) Y” may be interpreted as an instruction for the listener or reader to link 
one connectionist network to another. It follows then that if networks between two 
concepts are already linked, an expression connecting them may no longer be perceived 
as metaphorical. For example, life is a journey will not seem metaphorical to most 
readers, because the links between networks representing “life” and “journey” are pre-
connected. Such metaphors are quite common in everyday life. We may also encounter 
several novel metaphors in the course of a day. For example, Lloyd Bentsen, a U.S. vice-
presidential candidate belittled his opponent by stating “you, sir, are no John Kennedy” 
(in Glucksberg, 2011, p. 11). Such a statement, if interpreted literally, would seem 
obvious and purposeless; on the other hand, it can be quite meaningful figuratively. 
Similarly, when the media refers to company X is referred to as “the next Enron,” the 
listener must decipher the metaphorical meaning in order to understand the reference 
(Glucksburg, 2011).  
Furthermore, it is important to state that non-literal or figurative language does 
not necessarily involve metaphors, and in the present paper, I will be discussing 
metaphorical processing specifically. That is, figural language also includes proverbs, 
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idioms, irony, sarcasm, and metonymy. Although these processes are related, there is 
evidence to suggest that they are somewhat dissociable (e.g., the types of errors typically 
made in interpreting metaphors are different from those made in interpreting idioms, 
Papagno, 2001).  
Models in Metaphorical Processing 
Sequential approach. There are two main models of metaphorical processing. 
The first, more traditional, model was alluded to by philosophers as early as Aristotle and 
established by John Searle (1979). This model suggests that understanding metaphors 
occurs in a series of steps. That is, all phrases are first processed literally, and then the 
meaning of the statement is judged for accuracy. If the literal meaning is found 
inaccurate, it is sent to a non-literal processing centre for decoding. This model assumes 
that understanding metaphorical language would always be more effortful than 
understanding of literal language. It is sometimes referred to as the sequential approach 
or the indirect approach to metaphorical processing. This suggests that it takes more 
mental effort to recognize two metaphorically-related concepts as going together than 
two literally-related concepts. In this model, literal interpretations would always take 
priority as that is the first step of processing. Further, the literal interpretation must be 
judged as defective before a figurative one is derived. As will be discussed in the 
following sections, these assumptions have been shown not to be true.  
Direct approach. The second model of the way metaphors are understood is 
referred to as the direct approach or the parallel processing approach (see Honeck & 
Hoffman[1980] for a review of this literature). In support of this theory, Ortony et al. 
(1978) focused on the distinction between automatic language processing and effortful 
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language processing of metaphors. They found that the level of processing of 
metaphorical language is largely dependent on context (e.g., the sentence “let the cat out 
of the bag” is automatically understood as figurative when preceded by “Dean spoiled the 
surprise that Joan had been planning for their mother’s birthday party,,”( p. 471).  
Furthermore, metaphorical interpretations of expressions have been shown to 
occur automatically, and are not optional or dependent on a failure to understand the 
literal meaning of the expression. For example, Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin (1982) 
constructed a test in which sentences were presented with a target word and participants 
were told to judge if the literal meaning is true or false while ignoring the figurative 
meaning. Using this logic, an incongruent sentence would be one that is literally false but 
metaphorically true (e.g., “some offices are icebergs”). Four types of sentences were 
used: literally meaningful (e.g., “some fruits are apples”), literally meaningless (e.g., 
“some fruits are tables”), metaphorically meaningful (e.g., “some jobs are jails”), and 
scrambled metaphors that were metaphorically and literally meaningless (e.g., some jobs 
are butchers,” p. 88). This test is based on the Stroop (1935) colour-word interference test 
on which subjects must name the colour  of the font  of a word that denotes  a different 
colour (a more difficult task that reading out the word or naming the ink colour of word 
that denotes  the same colour). Glucksberg et al. proposed that if participants were truly 
able to ignore metaphorical meanings, the metaphorically meaningful sentences would 
take the same amount of time to reject as literally false as the scrambled metaphors. This 
was not the case. They found that metaphorically meaningful sentences showed an 
interference effect, taking longer to be judged as literally false than their scrambled 
counterparts or sentences in the literally false condition. These results suggest that 
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understanding metaphors occurs automatically and that participants have trouble 
inhibiting this understanding.  
In a variation of the study by Glucksberg et al., Keysar (1989) also showed that 
metaphors were difficult to ignore. In this study, a target word would make the statement 
either metaphorically true and literally false or metaphorically false and literally true. The 
interference effect would occur when the target word would be both metaphorically true 
and literally false. Reaction times were slower for the interference condition than the 
valid condition. That is, participants were unable to ignore the figurative meaning despite 
being able to focus on the literal meaning. This supports the idea that both meanings are 
processed by a parallel rather than a sequential system. According to Paivio (1978), 
language processing involves two processes (a verbal process and an imagery process) 
that “represent the activity of independent but interconnected systems that are specialized 
for picking up, storing, organizing, retrieving, and manipulating stimulus information” (p. 
163).  
Additionally, reaction time studies (e.g., Johnson, 1996) have found that 
participants respond quicker to metaphorical sentences such as cigarettes are timebombs 
rather than the simile counterpart (cigarettes are like timebombs). This finding suggests 
that metaphorical sentences are not necessarily converted into similes in order to be 
understood.  
Cognitive view. Goodman (1976) pioneered the cognitive view of metaphorical 
processing. According to this view, understanding metaphors requires the transfer of 
properties across symbol systems. That is, my earlier example, X is a warm person, 
would require the transfer of feeling a warm temperature to the affect associated with 
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being warm to a warm personality attribute. According to Seitz (1997), examples of 
symbol systems include language, music, and visual arts. Metaphors transfer properties of 
features or events from one symbol system to another. Therefore, I would posit that 
models that address the underlying cognitive mechanisms involved in processing 
metaphors should not focus solely on the linguistic aspects of the metaphor.  
Alignment theory of metaphor processing. The alignment theory is concerned 
with the order in which people process a metaphorical expression. That is, there are two 
potential modes of processing metaphors: a mode that involves deriving an abstraction 
from a base word to a target word, and a mode that involves aligning the terms to a 
representation and then projecting inferences from the base to the target (Gentner & 
Wolff, 1997). The first mode is referred to as an abstraction-first model. Given the 
metaphor “life is a journey,” the base (journey) is used to identify the category of which 
it is a prototypical member (e.g., an eventful period of time in which one passes from one 
stage or place to another). These properties are then conveyed to the target (life), by 
assigning it as a member of the same category as “journey.”  The second mode is referred 
to as the alignment-first model. In this mode, the relations between the elements and a 
representational structure are made. That is properties of both “life” and “journey” are  
aligned to overarching properties. Gentner and Wolff compared these two models by 
recording participants’ time to interpret metaphors primed by either the base term or the 
target term. They also included conditions in which they were not primed by either of the 
words, or primed by both words. Alignment theory would predict that there would be no 
difference between the priming conditions, whereas abstraction theory would predict an 
advantage for priming the base.  
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Metaphors included were taken from four conditions: high conventionality/high 
similarity (“that argument is a war”), high conventionality/low similarity (“that 
conversation is a war”), low conventionality/high similarity (“that philanthropist is a 
fountain”), and low conventionality/low similarity (“that developer is a fountain;;” p. 
351). It was found that in metaphors with high conventionality and low similarity, a base 
advantage did exist. However, in all other conditions, there was no base advantage. 
Gentner and Wolff (1997) took this to suggest that conventional metaphors are 
understood by abstraction, but that novel metaphors are understood by alignment. The 
abstraction model also can be shown not to be complete, because the same base can have 
different meanings depending on the target.  
The class-inclusion theory. The class-inclusion theory was proposed by 
Glucksberg and Keysar (1990). The theory was developed in order to show that 
metaphors such as cigarettes are timebombs are not simply comparisons between the 
topic (i.e., “cigarettes”) and a vehicle (i.e., timebombs). That is, saying "cigarettes are 
timebombs” is not the same as saying “cigarettes are like timebombs” (Gucksberg & 
Keysar, p.10). According to this theory, metaphors are class-inclusion assertions, in 
which the topic of the metaphor “is assigned to a diagnostic category” (p. 3). That is, in 
another example“my job is a jail” (Gucksberg & Keysar, p.10), a jail refers to the 
category of entities that confine one against one’s will, are unpleasant, and are difficult to 
escape from. The topic (job) would then be a part of that category. Similarly, in the 
metaphor “my lawyer is a shark,” the word shark refers to the super-ordinate category of 
predatory creatures (Glucksberg, 2011). This predatory property subsumes both lawyers 
and sharks. There is therefore a dual reference to the use of the word “shark.” This dual 
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reference is similar to that used in such statements as “boys will be boys,” where the first 
“boy” refers to young males, and the second to the stereotypically bad behaviours that are 
typical of boys (Glucksberg, 2011).  
 In the following example, Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) demonstrate that 
comparisons and class–inclusions are quite different. Consider the comparison “Canada 
is like the United States.”In comparisons, the predicate (United States) is more salient 
than the subject (Canada). Therefore, for most residents of the United States, this form of 
the statement is considered best because the United States is considered the prototype. 
For residents of Canada, the statement would be more apt as “the United States is like 
Canada..” In either case, both statements are easily interpretable. Now if we were to 
consider the metaphor “my job is a jail,,” we would see that “my job is like a jail” would 
work, but “a jail is like my job” would not be easily interpretable. Similarly, “Chicago’s 
linebackers are like tigers” is not as easily interpretable as “Tigers are like Chicago’s 
linebackers” (Glucksberg & Keysar, p. 5). Therefore, it appears that metaphoricity in 
language is mainly concerned with showing that one object fits into the same abstract 
category of another. In these cases, metaphors are not equivalent to similes and are more 
likely to be used in everyday language and literature. 
Glucksburg and Catrinel (2006) asked university students to paraphrase 
statements in either metaphor (X is Y) or simile (X is like Y) format. It was found that 
when the statements were phrased as metaphors, students came up with more abstract 
explanations; contrastingly, they were more likely to come up with concrete explanations 
for similes. For example, the metaphor “some ideas are diamonds” elicited responses 
alluding to creativity; whereas the simile “some ideas are like diamonds” elicited 
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responses alluding to value. It was also found that similes tended to elicit more negative 
responses than metaphors. For example, the statement “my lawyer was an old shark” 
tended to be interpreted as meaning experienced and competent; on the other hand, “my 
lawyer was like an old shark” tended to be interpreted as meaning ineffectual and 
toothless. These results are also in favour of the direct approach to understanding 
metaphorical language. I would this argue that understanding metaphors does not depend 
on the rejection of a literal meaning, and literal meanings of statements do not appear to 
have priority over figurative meanings. Instead, this understanding depends on a process 
of categorization that occurs in parallel to that used in understanding literal language.  
Further support for the class-inclusion theory comes from a study by Gernsbacher, 
Keysar, Robertson, and Werner (2001). In this priming study, it was predicted that the 
vehicle in a metaphor would be better understood in terms of the super-ordinate category 
that it belongs to rather than for its basic-level meaning.  Four types of primes were used. 
The first type was a metaphorically meaningful sentence, such as “That defense lawyer is 
a shark;” the second type was a literally meaningful sentence, such as “That hammerhead 
is a shark;” the third type was a nonsensical sentence, such as “His English notebook is a 
shark;” and the fourth type was a meaningful but unrelated sentence, such as “That new 
student is a clown” (p. 434).  After being presented with the prime sentence, participants 
were asked to indicate whether a target property statement made sense. Two types of 
target property statements were provided: those that were relevant to the metaphorical 
super-ordinate category (e.g., Sharks are tenacious), and those that were not relevant to 
the metaphorical meaning but were meaningful at a basic level of the vehicle (e.g., 
Sharks are good swimmers). The authors were interested in the verification latency (time 
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it took for participants to respond) following each type of prime-target combination. It 
was found that participants had slower verification latencies for property statements that 
were true but not relevant to the super-ordinate category of the vehicle following the 
metaphorical-sentence prime than the literally meaningful prime sentence, producing a 
suppression effect. On the other hand, participants had faster verification latencies for 
property statements that were relevant to the super-ordinate category of the vehicle 
following the metaphorical-sentence prime than the literally meaningful sentence prime, 
producing an enhancement effect. These results provide further credence to the class-
inclusion theory in that metaphors appear to activate the super-ordinate categories that the 
two items being compared share (Gernsbacher et al., 2001).  
The conceptual metaphor theory. According to Gibbs and Beitel (1995), when 
people process metaphors or proverbs, the literal meaning is bypassed altogether and the 
figurative meaning is accessed immediately. That is, people are equipped with cognitive 
maps of metaphorical information from various domains. More familiar source domains 
map on to less familiar or vaguer target domains in order to create meaning. Similar to 
the class-inclusion theory, these mappings are thought to be unidirectional (i.e., one 
domain of knowledge is used to structure another, but not the reverse). For example, in 
the metaphor love is a journey, one must understand one domain of experience (i.e., love) 
in terms of a very different and more concrete domain of experience (i.e., journeys). The 
experience of journeys is then mapped on to the target domain of love in order to enhance 
the meaning of this domain for that person. Note how the reverse “a journey is love” is 
not a helpful metaphor. This idea of conceptual mapping also extends to our collective 
mind in history (Gibbs, 1998). That is, Gibbs (1998) stated that “metaphoric thought 
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plays some role in the historical evolution of what words and expressions mean” (p. 93). 
For example, the root word “gen-,” which means to give birth, has been used 
metaphorically as a root of several words including “generate,” “genocide,” “gene,” 
“degenerate,” “engender,” etc.  I would imagine that such words required making new 
connections at some point in history, but that they became better integrated with time, 
losing their figurativeness and becoming more literal.  
Graded-saliency hypothesis (Giora, 1997). Although these models are helpful in 
comparing literal and figurative language, they are not sufficient in explaining how 
figural language is processed. An important step in doing so appears to be recognizing a 
similarity between two concepts. The similarity may involve cross-modal association 
(e.g., between emotional and logical centres). For example, Fodor (1981) described that 
the brain’s capacity to process relationships between two concepts may rely on a 
cognitive mechanism specialized in relating concepts across different cognitive domains 
and corresponding brain areas. Complicating the matter is that not all metaphors are 
processed in the same way. For example, Blasko and Connine (1993) have shown that 
metaphors that were rated as highly familiar are understood more quickly than those rated 
as novel. In fact, highly familiar metaphors are processed figuratively first. That is, 
metaphors such as “X is a warm person” and “Y is a cold person” are more easily 
understood as personality traits rather than temperatures. This suggests that once a person 
encodes the meaning of a metaphor and stores it in long-term memory, the cognitive 
mechanism responsible for finding a similarity between the two concepts in a metaphor 
may not be activated when the person encounters that metaphor subsequently. Giora 
(1997) posited that metaphors are only different from literal language when they are 
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novel. That is, it is not the type of language used but rather the saliency of the expression 
that determines how easily it is processed. This is referred to as the graded-saliency 
hypothesis, in which saliency depends on conventionality, frequency, familiarity, and 
prototypicality (Giora, 1997). The differences between these factors and how they 
interact has not been well established in the literature. This hypothesis is also in line with 
the Goldberg & Costa (1981) model of language acquisition, which states that newly 
acquired descriptive systems are processed separately (in the right cerebral hemisphere) 
from those utilizing well-routinized codes (in the left cerebral hemisphere).It is 
noteworthy that saliency also depends on the individual, and one metaphor may be very 
salient to one participant and completely novel to another. Due to this, most recent 
research in metaphors tends to include a familiarity rating for each metaphor in question. 
Neuropsychology of Figurative Language 
The idea that novel items are processed differently than familiar items is related to 
the neuropsychological concept of executive functioning.   According to Stuss & 
Alexander (2000), the concept refers to the abilities involved in performing actions that 
require the effortful control of more routine automatic processes. Executive functions are 
typically tested in one or more of these situations: (1) when the level of complexity of a 
task requires more than automatic processing, (2) when old information must be thought 
about in new ways, or (3) when the information to be processed is novel. Processing 
novel metaphors is therefore expected to load highly on these abilities. That is, the less 
familiar a metaphor is, the more executive control is needed to comprehend it. More 
conventional metaphors, therefore, may be processed automatically without necessarily 
requiring any abstract thinking skills needed to understand a novel metaphor.  
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Neuropsychologically, an important question relating to metaphorical processing 
is whether it fits more closely within the language domain or the executive functioning or 
working memory domain. For example, although it is known that children under four 
years of age are unable to comprehend and rarely produce metaphors (Vosniadou, 1987), 
it is less clear why this is the case. I would argue that this may be due to developing 
knowledge of concepts, developing linguistic facility, or developing executive 
functioning. From a Piagetian framework, children who produce poor interpretations of 
metaphors tend to be at the concrete or preoperational stages of cognitive development, 
and children who produce accurate interpretations tend to be at the formal operations 
stage (Smith, 1976). Furthermore, given the graded-saliency hypothesis, one would 
expect that neuropsychological processes such as verbal reasoning and executive 
functioning (abstraction and working memory) would be more taxed when the metaphor 
is novel. Neuroanatomically, such tasks are typically associated with the functioning of 
the prefrontal cortex (Stuss &  Alexander, 2000).  
The importance of understanding non-literal language for social interaction 
becomes evident when considering the clinical syndromes in which this ability is 
impaired ranging from autism to neurodegenerative diseases to schizophrenia (Thoma & 
Daum, 2006). Clinically, there is currently no English-language test of metaphorical 
processing specifically, and tests of figurative language generally consist of proverbs 
tests. The most commonly used test is Gorham’s proverb test (Gorham, 1956). Also used 
is the Proverb subtest of the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, 
Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001), which consists of only eight sayings that are presented in 
verbal expressive and multiple choice formats.  
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The utility of metaphorical processing tasks as tools in the differential diagnosis 
of neuropsychological disorders in adulthood remains largely unknown. Child 
neuropsychologists and speech-language pathologists have available the Test of 
Language Competence (Wiig & Second, 1985) to diagnose disorders of higher-level 
language disorders in children. On the other hand, a standardized measure to specifically 
evaluate metaphorical language in adults is not available. In adults, non-literal tasks 
(mainly proverbs) have been mainly been used in diagnosis is schizophrenia, followed by 
the differential diagnosis of dementia (Rapp & Wild, 2011). Research has shown that 
metaphorical processing can be specifically and differently affected by different lesions 
and syndromes. Therefore, it is important to develop a task of metaphorical processing of 
potential use in clinical settings.  
Evidence from lesion studies. Neuropsychological studies of metaphorical 
processing suggest that figurative language processes involve different brain areas than 
literal language processes. For example, the first neuropsychological study of metaphors 
compared patients with left-hemisphere damage, patients with right-hemisphere damage, 
patients with bilateral damage, and healthy participants (Winner & Gardner, 1977). They 
presented participants with a figurative sentence (e.g., “he has a heavy heart”, p. 719) and 
then they performed two tasks. One involved matching the sentence to one of four 
pictures: one showing a literal representation (i.e., a man carrying a heart), one showing a 
metaphorically correct representation (i.e., a man crying), one showing a quality of the 
adjective in the sentence (i.e., a 500lb weight), and one showing the noun (i.e., a heart).  
The second task required them to verbally explain their choice. It was found that 
participants with right-hemisphere damage were less likely to pick the metaphorically 
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correct representation than those with left-hemisphere damage. However, when asked to 
explain their choice, those with right-hemisphere were able to explain their choices, 
whereas those with left-hemisphere damage had more trouble doing so. These findings 
suggest that literal language and figurative language are processed in parallel networks 
that can be dissociated. Alternatively, the right hemisphere may be responsible for linking 
imagery with language. Needless to say, these findings are not conclusive. That is, those 
with left-hemisphere damage may have had more difficulty with expressive language in 
general, and that may have caused them not to be able to verbalize their choices.  
Additionally, those with right-hemisphere damage may have had trouble processing 
visual information in general, not necessarily as they related to metaphors.  
However, Brownell, Simpson, Bihrle, Potter, and Gardner (1990) showed that 
patients with right-hemisphere lesions performed poorly on a metaphoric task that did not 
involve visual stimuli. In this study, two groups were compared, an aphasic group with 
left-hemisphere stroke and a non-aphasic group with right-hemisphere stroke. The 
participants were asked to sort words that had two potential meanings. Some of the words 
were adjectives (e.g., “warm,” which has the alternative meaning loving) and some were 
nouns (e.g., “pen,” meaning writing utensil or cage). Stimuli were presented in triads (e.g, 
deep-wise-lake, crooked-deceitful-path, down-sad-elevator) and participants were asked 
to pick the two cards that would go together. The task is referred to as the Metaphor 
Triads Task, and several studies have adapted this task (discussed below). Patients with 
left-hemisphere lesions performed better on this task than those with right-hemisphere 
lesions. This study showed that metaphorical meanings of words are relatively spared 
after left-hemisphere damage and despite aphasia. It also showed a dissociation between 
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metaphorical and concrete reasoning, with metaphorical reasoning being apparently more 
related to right-hemisphere functioning.  
Giora, Zaidel, Soroker, Batori, and Kasher (2000) used highly conventional 
clichéd metaphors (e.g., “broken heart,” “lend a hand,” “warm heart”) and asked 
participants to provide an oral verbal explanation of four metaphors. Participants included 
people with left-brain damage, right-brain damage, and controls. It was found that for 
these types of metaphors, participants with right-brain damage performed as well as 
controls, whereas participants with left-brain damage performed worse than both groups. 
Among patients with left-brain damage, the extent of damage to the left middle temporal 
gyrus and the junctional area of the superior temporal and supramarginal gyri were 
negatively correlated with performance on the metaphor comprehension task.  Damage to 
different areas in the right hemisphere was not correlated with performance on this task. 
These results suggest that the left-hemisphere is dominant when it comes to 
understanding highly familiar metaphors.  
Overall, lesion studies seem to show that both the right and left hemispheres are 
involved in metaphorical processing to a certain extent. The differences in methodology, 
types of tasks used and patient groups likely influence the varying results of these studies. 
It is also clear that both familiarity and complexity play important parts in whether or not 
a metaphor is accurately understood, and these factors were not always controlled for in 
these studies.  
Evidence from clinical syndromes. Neuropsychologists typically use figurative 
language tests to assess a patient’s abstract thinking abilities. However, there is currently 
little research on the diagnostic sensitivity, specificity, and reliability of these measures 
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when it comes to different brain disorders or in cognitive processes. In the following 
studies, I will outline current research showing the potential benefits of a measure of 
metaphorical processing that does not place a demand on expressive language skills.  
Alzheimer’s Disease. One clue about the nature of metaphors and their 
relationship with literal language can be found in studying patients with early stage 
Alzheimer’s disease (Papagno, 2001). In this type of dementia, verbal communication 
difficulty is a frequent and early symptom. Specifically, phonemic structures of language 
are generally preserved whereas semantic structures may be affected. Papagno (2001) 
used an Italian metaphor comprehension test in which a metaphor is presented (e.g., 
“Marco e un leone,” Mark is a lion) and participants are asked to offer a verbal 
explanation. These metaphors were selected to be familiar, with the presumption that 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease would have known the meaning at some point, but 
have lost it due to the disease process. Their performance on this task was then compared 
to a normative group and performance on a test of (literal) verbal comprehension. 
Additionally, errors were then classified as a “concrete/literal interpretation” (25.59%), 
“opposite interpretation” (6.8%), “wrong/insufficient interpretation” (58.3%), and no 
response (9.2%; p. 1455).  Interestingly, these patients showed impairment on the literal 
comprehension task but showed no impairment on the metaphors task. It is possible that 
the metaphorical nature of the sentences in the figurative task may have provided a 
context that helped activate different pathways to meaning for these patients. This shows 
that metaphorical reasoning is not done in a step-wise progression, as would be predicted 
by Searle’s (1979) model of metaphorical processing, because such a model requires that 
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one understands the literal meaning of a phrase before rejecting it and examining its 
figurative meaning.   
Amanzio, Geminiani, Leotta, and Cappa (2008) used the same stimuli as Papagno 
(2001) along with some novel metaphors in a sample of 20 patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease. Consistent with Papagno’s findings, Alzheimer’s patients did not differ from 
age-matched in the conventional metaphors task. However, they were significantly 
impaired on the novel-metaphors task. This is likely due to the fact that executive 
dysfunction is present fairly early on in the course of Alzheimer’s disease. In fact, the 
impairment in comprehension of novel metaphors was found to be related to performance 
on executive functioning tasks, but not to overall cognitive abilities. Furthermore, there 
was no relationship between performance on the conventional metaphors task and the 
executive functioning tasks used in this study (Behavioural Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome, BADS; Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emsile, & Evans, 1996).  
The results of this study were interpreted to support the graded-salience 
hypothesis.  
Greene, Hodges, and Baddeley (1995) argue that the deficits in autobiographical memory 
in Alzheimer’s disease are in part due to retrieval processes linked to executive 
functioning. It is also noteworthy that although one could argue that novel metaphors are 
simply more difficult, this is likely not the only explanation. In fact, normal controls 
performed equally well on the novel and conventional metaphors (Amanzio et al., 2008). 
This is likely because patients with Alzheimer’s disease may have difficulty inhibiting 
the literal interpretation or coming up with a problem solving strategy for processing the 
novel metaphor. According to such an explanation, Alzheimer’s patients would 
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theoretically show less impairment on a task of metaphorical processing than patients 
with fronto-temporal dementias, in which prefrontal functions are one of the first to show 
a decline. Unfortunately, this type of study has yet to be conducted.  
Parkinson’s Disease. Patients with Parkinson’s disease have also been shown to 
have difficulties with metaphorical language processing (Monetta & Pell, 2007). Further 
this appears to be due to dysfunction of the fronto-striatal systems. Monetta and Pell 
administered a series of neuropsychological tests as well as a test of metaphor 
comprehension to patients with Parkinson’s disease as well as healthy controls. This test 
included prime-target sentence pairs with prime sentences being either metaphorical or 
literal, and target sentences either metaphor-relevant or metaphor-irrelevant. It was found 
that not all patients were impaired on metaphorical processing relative to controls. 
However, those patients with impaired verbal working memory were also impaired in 
metaphorical processing. Because verbal working memory is highly dependent on intact 
fronto-striatal systems, it was posited that metaphorical processing is also dependent on 
the functioning of this system. Furthermore, it was shown that fronto-striatal systems for 
working memory are often, but not always, affected during the early course of 
Parkinson’s disease.  
Down Syndrome. Papagno and Vallar (2001) investigated the pattern of cognitive 
impairment in a woman with Down syndrome, who had been able to acquire three 
languages including Italian, English, and French. Neuropsychologically, she had 
difficulty with visuospatial processing, abstract reasoning, and executive functioning; but 
she had average linguistic skills, including oral and reading comprehension as well as 
word-list learning and episodic memory. It was found that her performance was within 
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normal limits on a task of literal language comprehension and in the impaired range on a 
task of metaphor comprehension and a task of idiom comprehension.  Although not many 
conclusions can be drawn from case-study evidence, it appears that processing of literal 
and non-literal language involves dissociable brain mechanisms.  I would argue that in 
order for a double dissociation to be made, however, it must be possible to have impaired 
literal processing and intact non-literal processing (i.e., a patient showing the opposite 
pattern). It is also unclear which neuropsychological process was responsible for inability 
to comprehend non-literal language in Papagno and Vallar’s case.   
Learning Disabilities. Research has shown that children and adolescents with 
language-based learning disabilities tend to have more trouble with figurative language 
than literal language. For example, in a study examining metaphorical comprehension of 
adolescent boys (ages 16 to 18 years), Jones and Stone (1989) found that participants 
with a learning disability provided fewer correct metaphor interpretations than normal 
controls. In this study, there were two types of response modes: verbal explanation and 
paraphrase selection. An example of a metaphor used in this study was “A butterfly is a 
flying rainbow” (p. 252), for which the selections were: appropriate metaphorical (i.e., a 
butterfly is colourful), irrelevant factual (i.e., a butterfly is an insect), inappropriate 
perceptually based (i.e., a butterfly is wide), and inappropriate perceptually based in a 
different modality (i.e., a butterfly is fuzzy). It was found that paraphrase selection was 
significantly easier for both groups, but that adolescents with a learning disability 
performed worse on both tasks. Furthermore, this was not related to general vocabulary 
knowledge or to knowledge of task-specific vocabulary. Therefore, it was concluded that 
these differences were due to poor organization of semantic knowledge or deficient 
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inferential skills rather than a deficiency in the amount of semantic knowledge or 
semantic memory.  
Such differences are also found in younger children. Lee and Kamhi (1990) 
examined metaphoric processing in two groups of children (9 years 0 months to 11 years 
0 months of age) with learning disabilities (one group with a history of speech difficulties 
and one group without) and a group of children without a learning disability. All 
participants were asked to complete three verbal metaphor processing tasks: metaphor 
comprehension, metaphor preference, and metaphor completion. They were also asked to 
complete a visual metaphor task (the Metaphor Triads Task; Brownell et al., 1990). As 
expected, the group with a history of expressive language impairment performed worst, 
and both groups with learning disabilities were worse than the group without a learning 
disability on all four metaphor tasks. Lee and Kamhi argued that the implications of this 
study are that children with a history of learning disabilities continue to have difficulty 
understanding metaphors even after they gain some competence in literal comprehension. 
Additionally, whereas giving context helped children without a learning disability 
understand metaphors, it did not help children with a learning disability. This occurred 
despite context helping children with learning disabilities understand literal meanings.  
Nippold and Fey (1983) predicted that young children, who experience difficulty 
with literal language attainment as pre-schoolers, would later go on to have difficulty 
with figurative language attainment as pre-adolescents (9- to 11-years-old). Twelve pre-
adolescent children with a history of language acquisition difficulties and 12 pre-
adolescent children with normal language acquisition completed literal language tasks, 
non-verbal intelligence tasks, and a metaphorical comprehension task. The authors used 
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the same list of metaphors as Billow (1975). Interestingly, it was found that these 
children showed a deficiency in their understanding of metaphorical sentences while 
performing as well as controls on measures of literal language comprehension and non-
verbal intelligence.  
Taken together, these findings suggests that tests of metaphorical comprehension 
may be more sensitive than commonly used language measures at detecting those 
difficulties that tend to linger in children with a history of language impairment. 
Autism. Understanding metaphors is also challenging for individuals with autism, 
and this is thought to be related to impairment in theory of mind (Happe, 1995). Theory 
of mind can be thought of as the ability to accurately guess another person’s mental state, 
which is an essential cognitive process underlying people’s ability to engage in complex 
social interactions (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). It is assessed with several 
social reasoning tests of varying levels of complexity. It then follows that such a skill is 
needed when decoding a figurative expression. That is, the listener must interpret 
figurative expressions as clues to the speaker’s intended thought (Happe, 1995).  
Happe (1993) conducted a study examining the relationship between theory of 
mind and metaphorical processing. Participants included three groups of children and 
adults with autism (based on theory of mind performance) and one group with an 
intellectual disability not caused by autism. One group of autistic patients failed all theory 
of mind tasks (as is the case with the majority of autistic individuals), one group passed 
first-order theory of mind tasks only, and one group passed all theory of mind tasks. The 
group of participants with an intellectual disability not caused by autism also passed all 
theory of mind tasks. Participants were presented with three types of sentences: synonym 
 25 
 
(e.g., “father was very cross, he really was... angry”), simile (e.g., “father was very cross, 
he really was like... a volcano”), and metaphor (e.g., “father was very cross, he really 
was... a volcano”, p. 108).   
On this task, only those participants with autism who failed all the theory of mind 
tasks were impaired on the metaphorical processing task, performing at chance (Happe, 
1993). These participants were not impaired on the synonym and simile conditions. The 
findings of this study suggest that just as there may be different levels of theory of mind, 
there are different levels of figurativeness and that patients may show impairment at 
some levels but not others. Furthermore, the group with an intellectual disability but no 
autism performed significantly better on this task than participants with autism. Given 
that the only difference between the conditions was replacing “really was like” with 
“really was,” it seems that lower VIQ in itself does not explain autistic participants’ poor 
performance on metaphorical comprehension tasks but not the simile comprehension 
tasks.  
Patients with Asperger’s disorder also do not display the right hemisphere 
superiority typically seen when processing metaphors on a divided visual field task (Gold 
& Fust, 2010). In this experiment, participants with Asperger’s disorder and matched 
controls were presented with four types of word pairs: literal, conventional metaphors, 
novel metaphors, and unrelated. They were required to make a semantic judgement on 
whether or not the pair makes sense. When novel metaphors were presented to the right 
hemisphere (left visual field), control participants responded more quickly and were less 
likely to make errors. However, participants with Asperger’s disorder did not show this 
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right hemisphere advantage as compared to the left hemisphere, and were less accurate 
and slower than the control group in all conditions.  
These findings have not gone unchallenged (see Gernsbacher & Pripas-Kapit, 
2012). Norbury (2005) showed that semantic ability rather than theory of mind best 
predicted performance on a metaphor comprehension task. That is, only children with 
language impairment, with or without concurrent autistic features, were impaired on the 
metaphor comprehension task.  However, it is important to note that although this study 
included children with pragmatic language impairment, pervasive developmental disorder 
not otherwise specified, high functioning autism, and Asperger’s disorder, participants 
were not grouped according to these diagnostic categories. Instead, they were grouped 
into the following categories: language impaired only, language impaired with autistic 
features, autism spectrum only, and typically developing controls. The metaphor 
comprehension task used in this study was the same as that used by Happe (1993). It was 
found that possessing higher theory of mind did not predict performance on the metaphor 
task. This study’s results suggest that theory of mind development in early childhood may 
be necessary but not sufficient in later years.   
In a recent article, Giora, Gazal, Goldstein, Fein, and Stringaris (2012) attempted 
to further support their graded-salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997) by comparing the 
interpretation of metaphorical and literal language in young adults diagnosed with 
Asperger’s disorder as well as in healthy controls. Participants were asked to decide 
whether word pairs from five conditions were meaningful or not. The conditions were: 
familiar metaphorical (e.g., flower bed), novel metaphorical (e.g., dying star), familiar 
literal (e.g., wooden table), novel literal (e.g., Tverian horse), and meaningless (e.g., 
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bunny laundry). It was found that participants with Asperger’s disorder generally 
performed worse than typically developing young adults on both the literal and 
metaphorical processing tasks. That is, both groups showed a similar pattern of 
performance, in which the degree of saliency improved performance. However, unlike 
what is generally reported about Asperger’s disorder, the group in this study processed 
both literal and figurative language at a lower level, showing no advantage in literal 
processing. Given that individuals with Asperger’s disorder must not show a clinically 
significant delay in language or cognitive development to be diagnosed (APA, 2000), it is 
likely that the overall worse performance on these tasks was due to difficulties acquired 
after childhood.  
The conclusions of this study diverge from the widely held view that those with 
Asperger’s disorder fail to make sense of non-literal language. However, the level of 
abstraction or figurativeness required in metaphorical word-pairs may be lower than that 
required in a direct metaphor in the form X is Y. It is also worth noting that complex 
theory of mind tasks are difficult for patients with Asperger’s syndrome as well as for 
patients with bilateral damage to the orbito-frontal cortex, but not for patients with 
lesions affecting the left dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (Stone et al., 1998). Additionally, 
in a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging(fMRI) study examining brain activation in 
healthy adults, Gallagher et al. (2000) showed that the medial prefrontal cortex was more 
activated while participants read theory of mind stories or watched theory of mind 
cartoons than when shown control stories and cartoons. As will be discussed in the 
review of brain imaging literature subsequently presented, the prefrontal cortex has been 
shown to be quite important for metaphorical processing. This would suggest that 
 28 
 
neuropsychological tasks typically impaired with prefrontal damage (those requiring 
executive control and working memory) may be related to theory of mind as well as 
metaphorical processing. 
Schizophrenia. Patients with schizophrenia have long been known to have 
difficulties interpreting figurative language, with several studies examining these 
patients’ understanding of proverbs (Benjamin, 1944; Goldstein, 1959). More recently, 
authors have specifically examined metaphorical processing within this population, and 
have shown that concreteness is a main feature of thought and language disturbance in 
schizophrenia. Cutting and Murphy (1990) compared the performance of patients with 
schizophrenia, depression, and mania on a task of metaphorical processing in which they 
were asked to select a pair of words from three cards that went together best. This method 
was first used by Brownell and colleagues (1990; see Evidence from Lesion Studies 
section above for a detailed description). Patients with schizophrenia were more likely to 
choose antonym pairs (e.g., cold and warm) as going together than patients with 
depression or mania. Those patients were more likely to choose metaphor pairs (e.g., cold 
and hateful) than patients with schizophrenia. Because it was assumed that metaphorical 
processing is a right-hemisphere process, the authors took these results to mean that 
patients with schizophrenia rely more on their left-hemisphere when processing language 
than other psychiatric patients. However, it is now clear that this right-left distinction of 
metaphorical processing does not account for the complexity of this process.  
Using different methodology, Iakimova, Passerieaux, and Hardy-Bayle (2006) 
compared  the performance of patients with schizophrenia with that of patients with 
depression on metaphor interpretation. In this French-language study, the performances 
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of matched-samples of patients with major depression, schizophrenia, and healthy 
controls were compared on a task consisting of 10 metaphorical sentences.  Overall, both 
patient groups performed worse than normal controls on this task, with patients more 
likely to provide literal or concrete responses. It was also found that severity of the 
formal thought disorder in patients with schizophrenia was associated with more 
erroneous responses on the metaphors task. For those with depression, severity of 
depressive symptomatology and psychomotor retardation were associated with more 
erroneous responses.   
Using a more open-ended approach, Drury, Robinson, and Birchwood (1998) 
compared the performance of patients with schizophrenia, patients with delusions caused 
by other psychiatric disorders, and depressed patients on a metaphor comprehension task. 
In this study, patients were presented with passages (e.g. about two boys arguing), and 
then were given a statement about each passage (e.g., the boy’s mother said “Bill you 
really are a steam roller sometimes!”). Participants were then asked what the statement 
means. Interestingly, the test battery was performed once during the acute phase of 
schizophrenia and once following recovery. It was found that patients with schizophrenia 
performed worse than the other two groups during the acute episode. However, there was 
no significant difference in performance between groups on this task at recovery. In both 
cases, impairment in metaphorical processing was related to difficulties interpreting 
interpersonal contexts. Furthermore, these differences are considered state- rather than 
trait-dependent impairments.  
The neural basis of this impairment in metaphorical comprehension was 
investigated by Kircher, Leube, Erb, Grodd, and Rapp (2007). In this German-language 
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fMRI study, participants read sentences silently while in the scanner, and were asked to 
judge whether each sentence had a positive or negative connotation by pressing one of 
two buttons.  Thirty short metaphorical sentences (e.g., “Die Worte des Liebhabers sind 
Harfenklänge” [the lovers words are harp sounds]) and their literal counter parts (e.g., 
(“Die Worte des Liebhabers sind Lügen” [the lovers words are lies]) were presented (p. 
144). Participants were 12 patients with schizophrenia and 12 healthy controls. It was 
shown that the healthy controls showed the typical pattern when responding to 
metaphorical sentences, which is activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus (discussed in 
subsequent sections). Patients with schizophrenia had a weaker signal in this area and in 
the right superior/middle temporal gyrus than healthy controls. Additionally, activation of 
this area was negatively correlated with a measure of schizophrenia severity. This 
suggests that patients with schizophrenia show hypoactivation of areas necessary in 
metaphor comprehension. 
Improving metaphorical processing in clinical populations. Lundgren, Brownell, 
Roy, and Cayer-Meade (2006) were the first to show evidence of improving metaphorical 
processing in one patient with a right hemisphere lesion caused by a stroke. The 
intervention program was based on Thinking Maps (Hyerle, 1995), which is a tool 
typically used for children. Its main goal is to help the user represent semantic relations in 
words and narrative by making connections with visual representations of the features 
shared between words.  In the case of metaphors, the two words shown can be linked 
through their figurative visual representations. The authors showed that this patient 
displayed improved performance on a metaphor comprehension task. This occurred 
despite showing no improvement on neuropsychological tests measuring language and 
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visuo-spatial skills, indicating that the improvement in metaphorical processing was not 
due to general recovery.  
More recently, researchers such as Mashal and Kasirer (2011) have attempted to 
improve metaphorical processing in children with autism and learning disabilities. In this 
Hebrew-language study, researchers also used Thinking Maps in order to draw explicit 
connections between words that are metaphorically related. It was noted that such an 
exercise would encourage flexible thinking and switching from one semantic feature to 
another, therefore enhancing the development of these children. After this training 
program, participants were presented with a list of conventional metaphoric pairs (e.g., 
defense line), novel metaphoric pairs (e.g., transparent moment), and unrelated pairs 
(e.g., sport lemon). They were then asked to choose from four interpretations: correct 
metaphorical, literal, unrelated, and a final choice stating “this expression is 
meaningless.” They also completed semantic and letter fluency tests to assess executive 
functioning. In the pre-intervention testing, it was shown that children with learning 
disabilities or with autism both performed worse than typically developing children on 
the metaphor interpretation task. This is consistent with previous research discussed in 
earlier sections of this paper (e.g., Happe, 1993, 1995; Jones & Stone, 1989; Lee & 
Kamhi, 1990). 
Following intervention (Mashal & Kasirer, 2011), it was found that both groups 
improved overall. However, only the learning disability group improved on metaphors 
not previously encountered. It was also found that letter fluency performance predicted 
improvement after intervention, suggesting that executive functions are closely related to 
the comprehension of novel metaphors.  
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Therapeutic applications of metaphorical language. Metaphorical language has 
been described as not only a vehicle for communication, but also a method for change 
(Muran & DiGiuseppe, 1990). In fact, studies have found that the use of metaphors can 
enhance understanding between client and therapist during psychotherapy (Robert and 
Kelly, 2010). That is, clients are encouraged to use metaphors to help them express and 
structure their experience by connecting it to a similar concept through their perception of 
the world. Barker (1992) advised that when faced with resistant clients, therapists may 
use metaphor as an indirect method of communication in order to offer their clients 
“ideas, instructions, solutions to consider, reframing, or other inputs which may or may 
not be immediately acceptable” (p. 38). In this way, clients do not have to delve into 
details in the literal sense, but still understand and confront difficult issues in their lives.  
Evidence from Imaging Studies of Healthy Adults. To borrow a metaphor from 
Glucksberg (2003), neuroimaging has become a goldmine. Brain imaging studies are 
primarily involved in localization of metaphorical processing networks in the brain. 
These studies have focused on finding a left- vs. right-brain advantage, as well as 
localization of function within the frontal and temporal lobes.  
 Event-related Potentials. Using event-related brain potentials (ERPs), Pynte, 
Besson, Robichon, and Poli (1996) studied brain activity of participants while they read 
short familiar metaphors (e.g., those fighters are lions), unfamiliar metaphors (e.g., those 
apprentices are lions), or literal control sentences (e.g., those animals are lions) in French. 
The ERP was measured at the last word of each sentence, which was the same in all three 
conditions (e.g., lion). In this two-part study, the authors were particularly interested in 
the ERP component: N400. This component is elicited by all words, and the amplitude of 
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this component is typically associated with level of difficulty in literal sentences (for 
review, see Coulson, King & Kutas, 1998). It was found that a higher amplitude ERP was 
elicited with metaphorical sentences than literal sentences, although no difference 
between familiar and unfamiliar metaphors was found. This suggested that participants 
generally found metaphors more difficult to comprehend than literal sentences (i.e., that 
more processing was required to understand metaphorical sentences than literal ones). 
Additionally, more recent studies have shown that familiarity is dependent on participants 
and is typically assessed through individual ratings.  
In the second part of the study, Pynte and colleagues (1996) presented the 
metaphors with context to a second group of participants. The contexts presented were 
either relevant (e.g. they are not cowardly: those fighters are lions) or irrelevant (e.g., 
they are not idiotic: those fighters are lions). It was found that providing relevant context 
lowered the amplitude of the ERP signal of terminal words in metaphorical sentences to 
that of literal sentences. The authors indicated that when relevant context is provided, 
only the metaphorical meaning of the sentence is accessed. These findings can also be 
interpreted in light of the graded-salience hypothesis previously discussed. That is, the 
provision of context likely made the metaphorical items more salient and therefore as 
easily interpretable as the literal items used in this study.  
Coulson and van Petten (2002) replicated these findings with 18 healthy adults as 
they read sentences that ended with words used literally (e.g., he knows that whiskey is a 
strong intoxicant), metaphorically (e.g., he knows that power is a strong intoxicant), or in 
an intermediate literal mapping condition (e.g., he has used cough syrup as an intoxicant).  
In the literal mapping condition, the literal sense of the word was used in a way that was 
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meant to prompt the participants to map the conceptual structure from a different domain. 
In the example above, the intoxicant concept would be activated reminding the 
participant of an alcoholic drink, and then linking this with cough syrup. As expected, 
literal endings elicited the smallest N400 and metaphors elicited the largest N400. These 
results were interpreted in terms of the conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier, 1998), 
which is a general model of human cognition suggesting that there are input mental 
spaces and a “blended” mental space. Information is processed in the input mental place, 
and if unfamiliar, it is projected to the blended mental space. There, the “blend” develops 
structure through completion and elaboration processes. This leads to modification of the 
initial inputs and future reaction to similar stimuli. Coulson and Petten suggested that 
metaphorical language places higher requirements on conceptual integration that literal 
language, hence producing a higher N400.  
A Spanish-language study investigated the hypothesis that these N400 amplitudes 
would differ in the right hemisphere as compared to the left hemisphere (Sotillo et al., 
2004). Participants were presented with metaphorical sentences (e.g., “Green lung of the 
city”), followed by words that could or could not be defined by the metaphor (e.g., “park” 
vs. “semaphore”). The ERPs associated with the follow-up words were analyzed using 
temporal principal components analysis and source-localization algorithms. It was found 
that metaphorically related key words showed higher N400 amplitudes than non-related 
key words. Source-localization algorithms showed that the metaphorical key words 
resulted in more activation in the right middle/superior temporal areas as compared to 
unrelated words.  
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 Positron Emission Tomography. Bottini et al. (1994) hypothesized that the right 
hemisphere would show more activation in healthy adults than the left hemisphere when 
brain activity was examined using Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans.  PET 
studies involve examining relative regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) changes while 
participants complete different tasks. In this case, three linguistic tasks were used. The 
first involved metaphorical analysis of sentences, the second involved literal analysis of 
sentences, and the third was a lexical decision task (a control task). In the first task, 
participants were presented with sentences and then asked to indicate (by pressing one of 
two buttons) whether the sentence constituted plausible or implausible metaphors (e.g., 
the investors were squirrels collecting nuts vs. the investors were trams). On this task, 
significant activations were observed in the right frontal lobe (prefrontal region), right 
temporal lobe (middle temporal gyrus), and precuneus. In the second task, they were 
required to decide whether the sentences were plausible at a literal level (e.g., the boy 
used stones as paperweights vs. the boy used feathers as paperweights). On this task, 
significant activations were observed in the left prefrontal region and central cingulate.  
The authors concluded that metaphor comprehension selectively activates the 
right hemisphere whereas literal sentence comprehension activates left hemisphere 
structures. Additionally, neuropsychological mechanisms involved in processing 
metaphors likely include imagery (given activation of the precuneus), abstract reasoning 
(given activation of the prefrontal region), and episodic memory (given activation of the 
middle temporal gyrus). It is noteworthy here that familiarity of these metaphors was not 
evaluated; however, the authors purposely chose metaphors that were novel and 
unconventional.  
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 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Lee and Daprato (2006) 
argued that greater right-hemisphere involvement for metaphorical language is likely due 
to the fact that figurative language is more complex than literal language. In their fMRI 
study, they showed that in healthy adults, making semantic judgements about literal and 
figurative word meaning activated very similar networks. These networks included 
bilateral activation of Broca’s area, Wernicke’s areas, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
and the inferior parietal lobule as well as the left lingual gyrus and cerebellum. Although 
both conditions activated the same networks, the literal words condition showed greater 
levels of activation.  In both conditions, only simple language was used.  That is, in both 
conditions, participants listened to sets of three adjectives and were required to decide 
whether the last two adjectives had a similar meaning. An example of a stimulus from the 
first condition would be: hot, cold, chilly. An example from the figurative condition 
would be: hot, cold, unfriendly. Due to the lack of selective right-hemisphere 
involvement in processing figurative meanings, they concluded that the right-hemisphere 
is important for processing complex language materials and not metaphors per se. 
 Similarly, Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, and Kircher (2004) found no right-
hemisphere involvement using an fMRI paradigm. In this German-language study, short 
sentence pairs with either a metaphorical or literal meaning were presented.  For example 
“Der Wecker ist ein Folterknecht” (the alarm clock is a torturer) and “Der Wecker ist ein 
Elektrogerät” (the alarm clock is an electric appliance) were stimuli used in this study. 
Participants in this study were asked to judge whether or not the sentence was 
metaphorical and whether the sentence had a positive or negative connotation. For both 
types of sentences, no significant differences in laterality were found in the regions of 
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interest, which included the superior temporal gyrus, the middle temporal gyrus, the 
inferior temporal gyrus, the triangular and the opercular part of the inferior frontal gyrus, 
the precuneus, the temporal pole, and the hippocampus. In fact, left-hemisphere networks 
appeared to be more closely involved than the right-hemisphere networks on both tasks. 
These findings were later replicated using a more advanced method of fMRI analysis 
(Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2007).  
In addition, Stringaris, Medford, Giampietro, Brammer, and David (2007) also 
found that the right hemisphere is not specifically involved in metaphor comprehension. 
The authors presented participants with three types of sentences: metaphorical (e.g., some 
surgeons are butchers), literal (e.g., some surgeons are fathers), or non-meaningful (e.g., 
some surgeons are shelves). In this German-language study, participants were required to 
press one button if the sentence made sense and another if it did not. The left thalamus 
was activated specifically by metaphorical sentences. This finding was made more 
interesting by the fact that, behaviourally speaking (i.e., reaction time measures), there 
was no difference between responses to metaphorical or literal sentences. Additionally, 
the left inferior frontal gyrus was activated when participants responded to both 
metaphorical sentences and non-meaningful sentences, but not to literal sentences. This 
suggests that even when behavioural measures show that people process metaphorical 
and literal sentences in similar ways, they may be using different neurological systems to 
arrive at these responses.  
Shibata, Abe, Terao, and Miyamoto (2007) extended these findings with similar 
results in a Japanese-language study. That is, participants were presented with three types 
of sentences in the form “an X is a Y” that were either metaphorically meaningful, 
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literally meaningful, or non-meaningful. They were asked to press one of two buttons to 
indicate whether or not the sentence makes sense. Contrast measures demonstrated that 
the left medial frontal cortex, the left superior frontal cortex, and the left inferior frontal 
cortex showed higher activation when participants responded to metaphorical sentences 
than literal sentences. When participants responded to literal sentences, more activation 
was seen in the precuneus, and the right middle and superior frontal cortex.  
Eviatar and Just (2006) provided further support that left-hemisphere network 
may be implicated in metaphoric processing, but with some right hemisphere 
involvement. In this fMRI Hebrew-language study, brain activation patterns of 16 healthy 
participants were measured while they read brief three-sentence stories that concluded 
with either a literal, metaphoric, or ironic (sarcastic) sentence. When compared to reading 
literal sentences, reading the metaphorical sentences resulted in activation of the left 
inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral inferior temporal cortices.  Reading ironic (sarcastic) 
statements resulted in activation of the superior and middle temporal gyri as compared to 
reading literal statements, with metaphorical statements resulting in intermediate 
activation of these regions.  
On the other hand, using the Principal Components Analysis technique for fMRI 
data, Mashal, Faust, and Hendler (2005) found a link between right hemisphere networks 
and comprehension of metaphors. In this Hebrew-language study, 15 healthy volunteers 
were recruited. While in the scanner, three types of word-pairs were presented: 
conventional metaphors (e.g., sweet dreams), novel metaphorical expressions (e.g., 
wisdom dust), literal expressions (e.g., dog bite), and unrelated word-pairs (e.g., fuel 
rectangle). Participants were asked to silently decide if the words are metaphorically 
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related, literally related, or unrelated. It was found that a unique network, consisting of 
the right homologue of Wernicke’s area, right and left premotor areas, right and left 
insula and Broca’s area, was recruited for the processing of novel metaphors but not 
conventional metaphors. However, in an fMRI study involving Mandarin Chinese 
conventional versus unfamiliar metaphors, contrary to expectations, increased activation 
in the right-hemisphere occurred for familiar but not unfamiliar metaphors or literal 
sentences (Ahrens, Liu, Lee, Gong, Fang, & Hsu, 2007). These studies, however, 
involved different processes in that participants in the Ahrens et al. study simply 
passively read metaphorical sentences rather than being asked to make a decision about 
the relation of the words in a word pair.  In fact, Mashal and Faust (2010) showed that 
presentation style (i.e., word pairs vs. sentences vs. paragraphs) can affect brain 
activation patterns in processing metaphors. That is, it may be the case that there is an 
interaction between presentation style and metaphoricity in these studies. The authors 
presented participants with four-line metaphorical texts taken from Hebrew-language 
poetry as well as constructed literal counterparts (e.g., “And for a sick sun fields were 
cushioned/And it feels soft/Its yellow tongue will elongate/Against the river’s scales” vs. 
“And for a sick child pillows were padded/And he feels soft/His red tongue will 
elongate/In front of the doctor’s eyes”). To ensure participants paid attention while 
reading these sentences, participants were presented with a target word after reading each 
sentence and were asked to indicate whether or not the word was in the text. However, 
the authors were only interested in brain activation patterns that occurred while 
participants were reading these texts. It was found that both metaphorical and literal texts 
resulted in activation in the left and right posterior and anterior superior temporal gyri. 
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Contrary to the authors’ expectations, the metaphorical texts resulted in significantly 
lower activation in the anterior superior temporal gyri than literal texts. Although the 
authors introduced a task to ensure participants were paying attention, the task did not 
require participants to pay attention to the meaning of the text. Rather, it only required 
that participants scan the words and recognize a target word later on. This, as opposed to 
presentation style, may also have influenced the lack of involvement of the frontal lobes 
while reading metaphorical text.  
Schmidt and Seger (2009) attempted to parse out the effects of figurativeness, 
familiarity, and difficulty on the recruitment of neural systems involved in language in 
the right versus left hemispheres. In this study, participants were presented with four 
types of sentences while in the scanner: literal sentences, familiar and easy to understand 
metaphors, unfamiliar and easy to understand metaphors, and unfamiliar and difficult to 
understand metaphors. Participants were required to read each sentence and press the 
response key as soon as they had understood it. Overall, metaphors recruited the right 
insula, left temporal lobe, and right inferior frontal gyrus more so than literal sentences. 
Unfamiliar metaphors recruited the right middle frontal gyrus less so than familiar 
metaphors. Difficult metaphors showed higher activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus 
as compared to easy metaphors, which recruited the left middle frontal gyrus. This study 
highlighted the fact the figurativeness, familiarity, and difficulty all play a role in how 
and where metaphors are processed within the brain.  
Overall, fMRI studies confirm the role of left-hemisphere fronto-temporal 
networks in language processing as a whole. The right-hemisphere appears to be less 
involved than would be expected based on lesion studies when functional brain imaging 
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techniques are used in healthy adults. That said, the type of metaphorical processing 
involved in these studies is quite restricted given that the participants have to be in the 
scanner at the time, and responses are limited to pressing one of two buttons. Further, 
some studies involved passively reading metaphorical sentences while others required 
decision making about the items being read. Additionally, the procedures used to evaluate 
metaphorical processing varied greatly between these studies. For example, some studies 
only included a novel or familiar metaphor, and most did not require an individual 
familiarity rating by participants.   
 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation. Pobric, Mashal, Faust, and Lavidor (2008) 
attempted to establish causal relationships between local brain activity in the right 
hemisphere and metaphorical comprehension. They also attempted to shed a light on the 
difference in brain activation by familiar versus novel metaphors. The authors used 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to examine the role of the right 
hemisphere in processing novel and familiar metaphorical expressions taken from poetry. 
In this Hebrew-language study, participants were presented with four types of word pairs: 
literal, conventional metaphoric, novel metaphoric, and unrelated. Then they were asked 
to indicate if the words go together. It was found that rTMS of the right posterior superior 
temporal sulcus disrupted processing of novel but not conventional metaphors or literal 
word pairs. On the other hand, rTMS over the left inferior frontal gyrus selectively 
impaired processing of literal word pairs and conventional but not novel metaphors. 
These findings are best explained using the graded-saliency hypothesis. That is, more 
salient metaphors are more likely to be processed in the left hemisphere, whereas more 
novel ones are processed in the right hemisphere. In other words, the right hemisphere is 
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important in integrating the meanings of two seemingly unrelated concepts; and once this 
is integrated, processing is delegated to the left hemisphere. 
Evidence from cognitive science. In order to discern differential hemispheric 
involvement in metaphorical processing, cognitive studies have typically used the 
semantic priming paradigm with lexical decision tasks. That is, words are presented to 
the right-visual-field (left-hemisphere) or to the left-visual-field (left-hemisphere). Two 
types of priming effects could occur (Neely, 1977). Facilitation occurs when the 
recognition of a target word following a semantically related prime word is faster and 
more accurate. Inhibition occurs when the recognition of a target word following an 
unrelated prime is slowed down.  
Anaki, Faust, & Kravetz (1998) used the semantic priming paradigm in 
metaphorical (stinging-insult) versus literal (stinging-mosquito) word associates that were 
presented to either the left or right visual fields. In this Hebrew-language study, 
metaphorically related words were facilitated in the left-visual-field and literally related 
words were facilitated in the right-visual field. These results support the idea that 
metaphoric comprehension relies more on the right-hemisphere than literal word 
comprehension. Another finding of this study was that this effect was pronounced when 
stimulus onset was long but not when it was short. This was taken to imply that there is a 
slower decay of metaphorical meanings in the right hemisphere relative to the left-
hemisphere; and therefore that it is involved in more effortful or elaborated stages of 
metaphorical comprehension.  
In an extension of this study, Faust and Weisper (2000) investigated hemispheric 
differences in comprehending metaphoric word meanings in the context of a sentence. 
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Participants were presented with incomplete priming sentences followed by 
metaphorically true, literally true, or false target words. They were asked to decide 
whether or not the sentence is literally true. On this task, metaphorical sentences were 
slower and less accurately responded to regardless of visual field. Therefore, when 
context is provided, the role of the right hemisphere appears to be reduced. In order to 
further explain these results, Kacinik and Chiarello (2005) conducted an experiment with 
two conditions, one with single words and one with contextual sentences.  It was found 
that the right-hemisphere was activated with contextually-irrelevant words, whereas left-
hemisphere activation was more dependent on context.  
Given what is posited by the graded-saliency hypothesis and what is known from 
brain imaging studies, it can be posited that context provides familiarity, and that when 
metaphors are familiar, they are more likely to be processed by the left hemisphere.  
Using divided visual field experiments, Schmidt, DeBuse, and Seger (2007) presented 
metaphorical and literal sentences with varying familiarity. Familiarity was assumed to 
be equivalent to distance in semantic relationships (i.e., unfamiliar sentences contain 
distant semantic relationships and familiar sentences contain close semantic 
relationships). It was found that participants showed a right hemisphere advantage for 
unfamiliar sentences and a left hemisphere advantage for familiar sentences regardless of 
metaphoricity.  
Evidence from studies of artificial intelligence. Kintsch (2000) provided a 
computational model of model comprehension that is based on Gluckberg’s class-
inclusion theory (previously discussed). Recalling the metaphor “my lawyer is a shark,” 
Glucksberg has shown that people automatically understand that what is being referred to 
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is the super-ordinate category of predatory creatures. Kintsch’s model aimed to address 
how people know to assign a particular super-ordinate category rather than the category 
of fish for example. The model is based on an algorithm that uses latent semantic analysis 
to produce interpretations similar to those that people would produce. The algorithm uses 
vectors in semantic space. That is, a vector of the topic is merged with selected features 
of the vehicle vector. It is then compared with known landmarks in the semantic space.  
For example, the vectors for “lawyer” and “my lawyer is a shark” map on closely 
with the landmarks “justice,” “crime,” and “viciousness” and are less related with the 
landmarks “shark” and “fish.” Comparatively, the vectors for “lawyer” and “my lawyer is 
young” map on closely with the landmarks “jury,” “crime,” and “age.” This model also 
accounts for the non-reversibility of metaphors. That is, “my surgeon is a butcher” and 
“my butcher is a surgeon” produce different vectors and align differently to different 
landmarks. Interestingly, this model would suggest that literal comprehension and 
metaphorical comprehension are only different in terms of the semantic distances 
involved in the vectors.  
Wallington, Agerri, Barnden, Lee, and Rumbell (2011) have recently developed a 
computer system able to ascribe positive or negative affect to limited types of 
metaphorical expressions. Namely, the system is able to decipher metaphors in which a 
person is stated to be something non-human such as an animal, supernatural being, or 
object. The system does this by recognizing such utterances as metaphors, and then 
analysing them to determine the meaning of their (typically affective) content.  
The authors provide examples and the course of their processing. Consider the 
statement “Lisa is an angel.” Firstly, the metaphor detector recognizes the “X is a Y” 
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signal and recognizes that Lisa is a name of a person and “angel” is a noun. Based on 
Glucksberg’s theory of class-inclusion discussed above, the metaphor analyzer finds that 
“angel” fits the class of supernatural being. It also finds that angel can also belong to the 
category of person. It then would look at words linking “angel” and “person” and finds 
eight positivity-indicating words and 0 negativity-indicating words. The metaphor is then 
labelled as having a positive polarity. The system would then conclude that the metaphor 
“Lisa is an angel” means that Lisa is being labelled as a positive supernatural being.  
It is apparent that at present, such systems only represent a shallow type of 
metaphorical processing. As it stands, such systems are able to recognize metaphors and 
identify whether or not they are associated with negative or positive characteristics. 
Perhaps one limitation of these systemsis the sequential approach used to identify the 
metaphors. As previously described, most contemporary theories of metaphorical 
processing in humans have rejected the sequential approach and are in favour of direct 
parallel processing approaches.  
Metaphorical Processing Across the Lifespan 
Early childhood. Children have a propensity to attribute affective properties to 
visually perceived objects (Nathan & Hass, 1970). For example, children are likely to 
attribute a smiling face to cars. Such actions are called physiognomic attributions. These 
types of attributions were shown to begin around age three and continue to develop 
throughout childhood (Seitz & Beilin, 1987). That is, children as young as three 
attributed physiognomic properties to pictures of inanimate objects, and older children 
were able to do this more often. Additionally, physiognomic attributions were positively 
correlated with IQ measures.  
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 In Dent-Reed and Szokolsky’s (1993) extended definition of metaphors, 
children’s play actions can sometimes be metaphorical. For example, when making a 
teddy bear dance, the child is likening the teddy bear to a human. Children would also 
understand if an adult puts a small doll in a life-size shoe, and moves the shoe while 
making a motor noise, that the shoe is meant to be a vehicle.  Similarly, a child may wear 
a cup on their head as a hat. These action metaphors are understood even before children 
have a full grasp of language. These instances are examples of ways children can 
symbolically represent objects and actions that were previously only known to them 
through direct sensory-motor interactions (Winner, McCarthy, Kleinman, & Gardner, 
1979). These action metaphors may then act as precursors of psychological-physical 
metaphors that involve attributing physiological characteristics to psychological aspects 
of objects or individuals (e.g., person X is cold). Alternatively, these may represent 
mistaken use of words or objects (overextensions), which adults in turn mistakenly 
classify as metaphorical (See Winner, 1979). Such studies have shown that a basic 
competence in understanding figurative language is present even at the pre-school years, 
but that these abilities continue to develop through early adulthood (e.g., Billow, 1975; 
Cometa & Eson, 1978; Douglas & Peel, 1979; Pollio & Pollio, 1974).  
Pre-adolescence. Studies indicate that the pre-adolescent years appear to mark a 
period of abrupt acceleration in acquiring these skills, thought to coincide with Piaget’s 
formal operations stage of cognitive development (Piaget, 1972). For example, Billow 
(1975) studied metaphor comprehension in boys between the ages of five and 13 years, 
and the relationship with performance on Piaget-type cognitive tasks. He found that 
different aspects of metaphor comprehension (as measured by asking these children to 
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orally explain a list of metaphors) were related to concrete operational mechanisms and 
formal operational mechanisms respectively.   
Furthermore, developmental studies appear to show that mental imagery is an 
important part of comprehension of figurative language. Nippold and Duthie (2003) 
compared school-age children’s  (mean age: 12.3 years) and adults’ (mean age: 27 years) 
understanding of idioms as it relates to their ability to form mental images. Participants 
were presented with a number of figurative sentences and were asked to describe in 
writing their own mental images for each expression. They were then presented with a 
multiple-choice task to measure their comprehension. It was found that school-age 
children tended to describe images that were less sophisticated, more concrete, and less 
comprehensively descriptive of the expressions than those of adults. Although this study 
shows that the formation of mental images may be important in understanding metaphors, 
it is also possible that adults are better able to describe these images in writing than 
school-age children. Nippold and Martin (1989) found that interpretation of figurative 
language (idioms) was significantly correlated with specific measures of literacy in 
adolescents.  
Metaphorical Processing and Cognitive Aging. It is well known that 
vocabulary knowledge continues to improve with age, showing little decline well into the 
last years of life (Verhaeghen, 2003). However, despite what was previously assumed in 
the literature, the format of testing recently has been shown to influence differences in 
performance between age groups (Bowles & Salthouse, 2008). That is, although older 
adults’ vocabulary abilities are generally better than younger adults overall, younger 
adults perform better on free expression of definitions than synonym multiple choice, 
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whereas older adults tend to perform equally well in both formats. Therefore, the 
difference favouring older adults is less pronounced for free expression than multiple 
choice. Presumably, this pattern results from the fact that expressive vocabulary taps 
reasoning and memory more than multiple-choice vocabulary, and reasoning and 
memory are areas in which younger adults on average surpass older adults (Burke, 
MacKay, & James, 2000). When it comes to literal reading comprehension, older adults 
are known to have more trouble inhibiting irrelevant information than younger adults 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1988). This ability to suppress intrusive thoughts, behaviours, or 
material is in turn is thought to be associated with working memory capacity (Rosen & 
Engle, 1998). Working memory capacity, in turn, is a complex concept and is thought to 
depend on a combination of storage capacity, processing efficiency, and ability to 
coordinate simultaneous activities (Salthouse, 1990). Coincidentally, Broadbent (1971) 
used the metaphor of a desktop to describe working memory. That is, working memory 
functions as the space for carrying out one’s cognitive “work” and for keeping items 
recently used in order to carry out this work, just as a desktop is used for both carrying 
out ones work (e.g., writing) and storing needed items (e.g., papers, books, bills, receipts, 
etc.).  Given such theories of cognitive aging, older adults are predicted to show 
reductions in performance on cognitive tasks because they have less of the relevant 
information available. This becomes troublesome when a large chunk of information 
must be integrated or evaluated before reaching a decision. Whether or not these changes 
are related to difficulties with metaphorical processing remains uncertain.  
Newsome and Glucksberg (2002) compared metaphor comprehension in older 
and younger adults using a timed property-verification task. In this priming task, 
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participants were asked to indicate if sentences made sense or not. The sentences were 
metaphorical (e.g., my father’s dead-end job is a jail) or literal (e.g., his jacket was 
corduroy), and were either sensible or insensible (e.g., corduroy swims in the lake). On 
this task, there was no difference between older and younger adults in that both groups 
benefited from metaphor-relevant primes and were able to filter out metaphor-irrelevant 
primes.  
However, when it comes to proverb comprehension, it has been shown that this 
ability varies with age (Nippold, Uhden, & Schwarz, 1997). The ability to explain 
proverbs improves markedly during adolescence and into early adulthood, plateaus 
during the 20s, remains stable into the 50s, and begins to decline in the 60s reaching 
statistical significance during the 70s (Nippold et al., 1997). In a German-language study, 
Uekermann, Thoma, and Daum (2008) showed that the proverb comprehension 
reductions in older adulthood appear to be related to reduced executive functioning skills, 
namely in working memory. This study required participants to choose one of four 
explanations for each proverb. 
 For example, the alternative interpretations for the proverb “all that glitters is not 
gold” were: (1) abstract meaningful (things are often not what they seem to be), (2) 
abstract-meaningless (life is not only about becoming rich, because that alone does not 
make anyone happy), (3) concrete-meaningful (metals which are less valuable than gold 
may also glitter... thus, glitter alone is no indicator of high value), and (4) concrete-
meaningless (gold is not the most valuable of all metals). In this study, abstract 
meaningful responses were correct, whereas the next three options represented different 
error types. Older adults chose fewer correct responses than younger adults, and were 
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more likely to choose the concrete-meaningful responses. Regression analyses showed 
that working memory measures and years of education were the best predictors of correct 
responses. 
When it comes to idioms and metonyms, Qualls and Harris (2003) showed that 
when the effects of reading comprehension and working memory are co-varied, older 
adults outperformed younger adults on the comprehension of idioms and metonyms but 
not metaphors in an exclusively African American sample. These findings suggest that 
working memory is an important aspect of understanding figurative language, and that 
different types of figurative language are differentially influenced by age.  
Monetta, Ouellet-Plamondon, and Joanette (2007) compared older (between 50 
and 65 years old) and younger adults (between 20 and 30 years old). Participants were 
required to perform a version of the metaphor-triad task described earlier (Brownell et al., 
1990) with and without any interference (counting backwards). The main finding of this 
study was that older adults had more difficulty than younger adults on this task in both 
conditions. On the interference condition, the younger adults showed a decline in 
performance as compared to the non-interference condition, whereas the older adults did 
not show this decline. It was suggested that older adults may have had working memory 
constraints without the interference, and as such there was no difference between the 
interference and no interference conditions due to a floor effect.  
Mashal, Gavrieli, and Kave (2011) found that older adults were less likely than 
younger adults to identify metaphorical word pairs as plausible; however, they were more 
likely to rate metaphorical expression as familiar (as opposed to novel) than younger 
adults. This suggests an inverse relationship between familiarity ratings and ability to see 
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a similarity between two words that are metaphorically related. In this Hebrew-language 
study, examples of conventional metaphors included “sweet smile” and “stock crash;” 
examples of novel metaphors included “pure hand” and “diamond eyes;” examples of 
literal expressions included “police officer” and “movie ticket;” and examples of 
unrelated word pairs included “cheek brains” and “splendor dog.”  
CHAPTER 2 
The Present Study 
The body of research on metaphor comprehension as it relates to cognitive aging is 
sparse. As previously reviewed, most of the work on figurative language has focused on 
proverb interpretation (Douglas & Peel, 1979; Drury et al., 1998; Gallagher et al., 2000; 
Gibbs & Beitl, 1995; Goldstein, 1959; Gorham, 1956; Iakimova et al., 2006; Martin & 
McDonald, 2003; g, 1989; Nippold & Duthie, 2003; Nippold & Martin, 1989; 
Uekermann et al., 2008), or very brief metaphors or word pairs (Ahrens et al., 2007; 
Amanzio, et al., 2008; Anaki et al., 1998; Blasko & Connine, 1993; Bottini et al., 1994; 
Brownell et al., 1990; Cometa & Eson, 1978; Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Eviator & 
Just, 2006; Faust & Weisper, 2000; Gernsbacher et al., 2001; Giora et al., 2012; Gold & 
Faust, 2010; Kircher et al., 2007; Lee & Dapretto, 2006; & Rapp et al., 2007). Further, 
the interacting effects of format of presentation (free expression versus multiple-choice) 
and cognitive aging have not been studied.  
 In the present study, the first goal was to assess the sensitivity of a newly-
constructed  task of metaphorical processing (Iskandar & Baird, 2013)  to the effects of 
aging. A second goal was to examine the validity of the measure by determining whether 
there were expected associations between metaphorical processing  andperformance on 
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neuropsychological tasks that load highly on working memory and other executive 
functions.  
In order to accomplish these goals, a  study was conducted by Iskandar and Baird (2013), 
in which a series of high-imagery metaphors was selected from a list of normed 
metaphors (Katz, Paivio, Marschark, & Clark,1988) and presented to university students, 
who were asked to write down a good explanation of each metaphor. These students also 
completed a series of neuropsychological tests: Auditory Consonant Trigrams, Sentence 
Repetition, and Digit Span. The purposes of this study were to see whether university 
students would provide answers naturally (without prompting) that could be classified 
into four categories--abstract-complete (AC), abstract-partial (AP), concrete (CT), and 
unrelated/other (OT), to develop a scoring system to be used for the main investigation, 
and to use these naturally-occurring responses to create a multiple choice formatted task 
with an exemplar of each response type as a potential choice. Correlation analyses were 
run in order to find associations between the category of the participants’ responses and 
performance on the neuropsychological measures with the hypothesis that measures of 
working memory would predict performance on the initial free writing test for student 
participants. In the present study the performance of older and younger adults was 
compared on both formats of the Metaphor Interpretation Test, with exploration of 
interactions between test format and age group.  Given that all metaphors were chosen to 
be high in imagery, a measure of visual-spatial abstract thinking as well as another 
measure of verbal abstract thinking was administered. Further, to evaluate the effects of 
premorbid verbal intelligence, the North American Adult Reading Test (NAART35) was 
administered.  
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 The following directionalhypotheses were examined: 
1. (a) Older adults were expected to provide more concrete answers than younger adults 
(i.e., they will provide a greater number of CT answers than younger adults on free 
response and choose a greater number of CT answers on multiple choice).  
(b) Younger adults were expected to provide more abstract answers than older adults (i.e., 
they will provide a greater number of AC responses and choose a greater number of AC 
responses on multiple choice). This hypothesis is based on results of studies of proverb 
comprehension, which have shown that older adults’ free written responses (Nippold, 
Uhden, & Schwartz, 1997) and multiple choice responses (Uekermann, Thoma, & Daum, 
2008) tend to be more concrete than younger adults’. 
 (c) Based on work by Bowles and Salthouse (2008) examining the effects of age on 
performance on vocabulary tests in various formats, younger adults were expected to 
perform better (i.e., provide more abstract complete [AC] responses) on the free response 
version than older adults, whereas the difference was expected to be less pronounced on 
the multiple choice version. Current research has yet to explain the reason for more 
pronounced age effects on free response compared to multiple-choice vocabulary tests, 
but this finding may stem from greater demands on reasoning and memory skills in the 
free response than in the multiple-choice format. 
2. (a) Based on previous work (Iskandar & Baird, 2013) it was expected that working 
memory (i.e., the Digit Span forward score , Digit Span backward score, and Sentence 
Repetition total score) would be associated with greater abstract and lower concrete 
responding on the Metaphor Interpretation Test and (b) that performance on the multiple 
choice format would be positively correlated with performance in the free writing format 
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(i.e., number of AC free response will be correlated with number of AC responses chosen 
on  multiple choice, etc.)  
The following exploratory hypotheses were examined: 
3. In order to examine a wider spectrum of the abilities associated with performance on 
the Metaphor Interpretation Test (i.e., number of AC responses and CT responses), 
correlations with measures of working memory, verbal and visual-spatial abstract 
thinking, processing speed, reading ability, and cognitive flexibility were examined. In 
order to further investigate these associations, multiple regression analyses were 
performed to see which scores best predicted the number of AC responses and number of 
CT responses. Auxiliary analyses were also conducted for number of AP responses and 
number of OT responses in order to explore whether these scores also could be predicted 
by neuropsychological measures.   
4. (a) Based on the suggestion that working memory differences account for differences 
in figurative language between older and younger adults (Qualls & Harris. 2003), it was 
predicted that co-varying on the Sentence Repetition total score (the working memory 
measure with the strongest correlation with AC in previous work (Iskandar & Baird, 
2013) would eliminate the age difference in number of AC responses. (b) Based on the 
theory of cognitive reserve (for critical review of this concept, see Stern, 2002), it was 
predicted that older adults who performed well on measures of estimated crystallized 
verbal intellectual abilities  likely would not  show the differences in AC responses that 
are expected with age (i.e., a lower number of AC responses than in younger adults). That 
is, these age differences might not be apparent until scores on the metaphor interpretation 
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test were statistically adjusted for crystallized verbal abilities by using the NAART total 
score as a covariate.  
5. Although familiarity was not associated with performance in previous work (Iskandar 
& Baird, 2013), it is possible that there is an age interaction between familiarity (with the 
metaphors) and performance. This would be in keeping with the graded-saliency 
hypothesis (Giora, 1997) and studies showing that metaphors rated as more familiar are 
processed quicker (e.g., Blasko & Connine, 1993). In order to explore this possibility, 
interactions between familiarity and age group were examined as a possible explanation 
of any difference in number of AC responses provided. 
CHAPTER 3 
Methods 
Participants 
A sample of 80 participants was collected. Forty older adults (50- to 74-years old and 40 
younger adults (16- to 38- years old) were included in the study (See Table 1 for 
demographic details).  Of the 40 older adults, 34 were biological parents, 3 were 
biological grandparents, 2 were biological aunts, and 1 was an unrelated friend. Ethics 
approval was granted by the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board, and informed 
consent was obtained from all participants before testing. 
Table 1 
 
Sample Demographics 
 
Measures  Older Adults Younger Adults 
Age 56.55 (6.55)   23.23 (6.18) 
Education  15.22 (2.91)   14.40 (2.15) 
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% Female  77.5 82.5 
Estimated FSIQ 104.93 (9.32) 104.50 (7.46) 
Note. For Age, Education, and Estimated Full Scale IQ (FSIQ), means are provided with 
standard deviations in parentheses. IQ was estimated using an abbreviated version of the 
North American Adult Reading Test.  
This sampling of young-old participants (over 50) was thought to be important in 
showing the sensitivity of the Metaphor Interpretation Test to early cognitive changes 
with age. Participants were recruited for this project through the University of Windsor 
Research Participant Pool. The recruitment advertisement asked students to bring a 
relative or a friend over the age of 50 years. Students received bonus point credits 
towards a participating course of their choosing, and the members of the older adult 
group were entered to win one of four $20 gift cards. Student participants and a relative 
or acquaintance over 50 years old were interviewed by a research assistant and the author 
respectively in separate rooms of the Centre for the Study of Cognition and Function 
across Adulthood, a research laboratory located at the University of Windsor. Participants 
were asked about their primary language (language used most often in the last four years 
for speaking, reading, and writing), years of education, and age, as well as about any 
history of psychiatric illness, neurological illness, and head trauma. Participants with a 
significant history of psychiatric illness, neurological illness, or head trauma known to 
affect cognitive functioning were excluded (see Appendix B for interview form). 
Participants who reported that English was not their primary language in reading and 
writing and those who had completed less than four years of education solely in English 
also were excluded. The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (see Materials and Procedures) 
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was administered to the older adult group to screen out for dementia or mild cognitive 
impairment with a cut off score of 24/30 (McLennan, Mathias, Brennan, & Stewart, 
2011). If the nominated older adult did not meet criteria for the study, the student was 
nonetheless awarded partial credit. The selection criteria resulted in 5 pairs (n =10) being 
excluded from the study.  
Materials and Procedure 
Eligible participant pairs were tested in adjacent rooms at the same time by the author 
and a research assistant. Each participant completed the Metaphor Interpretation Test first 
(free response then multiple choice) and then they were asked to complete a number of 
tasks as described below in a randomized order.  A list of the variables to be analysed is 
provided in Table 2. 
 Metaphor Interpretation Test. Twenty  metaphors were used in the original 
version of this measure, as described in Iskandar & Baird (2013). All items were taken 
with permission from Katz et al. (1988). To develop the measure for the present study, an 
item analysis was conducted of the data gathered from undergraduates and summarized in 
Iskandar & Baird..  This analysis revealed that three metaphors (babies are angels; a 
skyscraper is the giraffe of buildings; divorce is the earthquake of the family) had elicited 
no concrete answers in that study and that almost all participants had givenabstract 
complete responses. Consequently, these three metaphors were not included in the 
Metaphor Interpretation Test in the present study.  
 As described in Iskandar & Baird (2013), participants in the present study were 
asked to rate “how familiar is this metaphor?” on a five point scale: (1) not at all familiar, 
(2) somewhat familiar, (3) quite familiar, (4) highly familiar, and (5) very highly familiar. 
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Then, participants were instructed to “Please explain what you think the metaphor means. 
Write down a good explanation of the metaphor.” The scoring system developed in 
Iskandar & Baird  was slightly altered in some cases to better reflect the criteria below.  
The following general criteria for scoring were used: 
 An Abstract Complete (AC) response provides a full explanation of the metaphor, 
using a super-ordinate category that is pertinent for both the vehicle and topic of the 
metaphor. 
 An Abstract Partial (AP) response provides an abstract explanation that is 
incomplete; or uses a super-ordinate category that is correct but less pertinent to both the 
topic and the vehicle 
 A Concrete (CT) response provides an explanation that is indicative of concrete 
thinking (e.g., concentrates on physical similarities when a pertinent functional similarity 
is present; it provides a literally true statement that does not explain the similarity). 
 An Other/Unrelated (OT) response provides a clearly wrong explanation, but not 
evidently due to concreteness. 
Keeping a separate tally of the frequency with which a given participant made each 
type of response allowed for a clearer interpretation of the type of error or response style 
a participant (and potentially, a patient in a clinical setting) is likely to have. Specific 
criteria for scoring can be found in Appendix A.For example, a participant might give 13 
AC responses, 2 AP, 1 CT, and 1 OT responses. The number of each type of response 
served as a dependent measure in one or more of the analyses concerning the association 
of neuropsychological test scores with performance on the Metaphor Interpretation Test. 
Following scoring, an item difficulty index (as described in Hambleton, Swaminathan, & 
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Rogers, 1991) was calculated for each metaphor based on the proportion of participants 
who made an AC response as compared to other response types (see Iskandar & Baird, 
2013).  
A research assistant was trained to score the metaphors using previous samples. A 
random sampling of twenty protocols from the present study was scored by this second 
rater to ensure inter-rater reliability for all response types. Based on previous studies 
(e.g., Nippold, Uhden, & Schwarz, 1997), an inter-rater correlation co-efficient of 0.90 
was considered sufficient. Examination showed that the scoring criteria met this standard. 
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was 0.97 (95% CI 0.91–0.99) for AC 
responses, 0.94 (95% CI 0.84–0.98) for AP responses, 0.95 (95% CI 0.88–0.98) for CT 
responses, and 0.89 (95% CI 0.71–0.95) for OT responses. 
Based on responses from the Iskandar & Baird (2013) study, a multiple choice format 
of the metaphor interpretation task was constructed. This format included one example of 
each response type for each metaphor as an alternative. The response types were 
presented in random order for each multiple choice question. That is, each question had 
one AC, one AP, one OT, and one CT response as choices. The instructions for this were 
“Here are some metaphors. Each one has four different possible meanings below it.  For 
each metaphor, read all possible meanings and circle the one that best explains the 
metaphor..” For example, the following item was presented: 
“Education is a lantern” means: 
a) Education can illuminate one’s life. 
b) When you learn, things become clear. 
c) You have to work hard in school to light up the lantern. 
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d) Education continues forever, and you are always learning. 
Working Memory: Digit Span (from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 
Third Edition (WAIS-III); Wechsler, 1997). To evaluate short-term memory and 
attention span, digit span forward of the WAIS-III was administered. This involved 
asking participants to repeat a series of digits, increasing by one digit every two trials. 
The digit span forward task mainly involves the phonological loop, which is responsible 
for maintaining a string of verbal items in a given temporal order. Digit span backward 
was also administered. This task involves asking participants to repeat digits in the 
reverse order of presentation. This places a higher demand on working memory by 
involving the central executive. Both aspects of this task are affected somewhat by 
cognitive aging (Wechsler, 1997), but substantially more by education (Ardilla & 
Rosselli, 1989; Ostroski-Solis & Lozano, 2006). Practice effects on these tasks are 
negligible and there is  high test re-test reliability (McCaffery, Duff, & Westervelt, 2000).  
Sentence Repetition Test (Spreen & Benton 1977 [in Strauss, Sherman, & 
Spreen, 2006]). Sentence repetition was used to evaluate immediate memory for 
sentences of increasing length (Strauss et al., 2006). This measure involves both 
linguistic knowledge and working memory, specifically measuring the maximum amount 
of meaningful verbal information that one can hold in memory. According to Meyer, 
Volker, & Diep (2000), this test is highly correlated with digit span forward (Pearson r = 
.75), with digit span backward (Pearson r =.66), and with Full Scale IQ (Pearson r = 
.62). Age has been found to affect performance in some studies (Spreen and Benton, 
1977) but not others (Vargo & Black, 1984). Gender has been found not to affect 
performance, whereas education and IQ do (Vargo & Black, 1984). This test has been 
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found to have an acceptable test-retest reliability of .71 in children with mixed diagnoses 
(Brow, Rourke, & Cicchetti, 1989) and of .84 in patients with chronic schizophrenia 
(Klonoff, Fibiger, & Hutton, 1970). In relation to other measures, it is reported that 
sentence repetition correlates with Digit Span Forward at r = .75, and Digit Span 
Backward at r = .66 (Meyers et al., 2000).  
Estimated verbal intelligence. The North American Adult Reading Test 
(NAART35) is a measure of premorbid cognitive ability that is often used to estimate 
lifelong verbal IQ (Strauss et al., 2006). This test consists of 35 irregularly spelled words 
that participants are asked to read aloud. The words are scored for accuracy, with both 
Canadian and American pronunciations counted as correct. This test has been shown to 
have high validity and reliability across the lifespan (Uttl, 2002). NAART35 scores 
increase with age across the lifespan and with years of education, but they are unrelated 
to gender.  The NAART35 is a short version of the full NAART, which consists of 61 
items.  The NAART35 and full NAART have been found to be equally precise and valid 
in predicting VIQ (Uttl, 2002).  
 Abstract Thinking: WASI-2 Matrix Reasoning. On this task, participants are 
required to view an incomplete visual matrix or series pattern and select the response 
option that completes the matrix or series (Wechsler, 2008). In addition to being a 
measure of visual-spatial abstract thinking, this measure places a high load on working 
memory (Lichtenberger & Kaufman, 2009). Performance on this task is known to steeply 
decline with age (Elias et al., 2011, Wechsler, 2008). This test is based on and is strongly 
correlated (r = .80) with Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (Wechsler, 1997), which 
in turn is associated with measures of working memory (Salthouse, 1993). It is also 
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associated with the Halstead Category test and measures of verbal fluency (Dugbartey et 
al., 1999).  The Matrix Reasoning subtest is known to have high reliability across 
different age groups (average r = .90; Tulsky, 2003), and performance is highly related to 
education (Elias et al., 2011).  Similar findings are seen in Raven’s Coloured Progressive 
Matrices with large education effects (Smits, Smit, van den Heuvel, & Jonker, 1997) and 
moderate reliability (Salthouse, 1993).   
Processing Speed and Cognitive Switching: Trail Making Test (Trails A & B; 
Reitan, 1958). The Trail Making Test is a measure of attention, speed, and cognitive 
flexibility (Strauss et al., 2006). This test involves two separate tasks measuring 
somewhat different abilities. In the first task, the participant is asked to connect 25 
encircled numbers randomly arranged on a page in order (Part A). In the second task, the 
participant is required to alternate between 25 numbers and letters in order (Part B). As 
such, the second task is considered more effortful, requiring more executive control than 
the first task. Correlations between the two tasks have been found to range from r = .31 to 
r = .60 (Strauss et al., 2006).  
 Hester, Kinsella, Ong, and McGregor (2005) have shown that age and years of 
education significantly impact performance on this test. Performance on both parts of this 
test declines with age. According to Hester et al., gender has a very small effect on 
performance. Steinberg, Bieliauskas, Smith, and Ivnik (2005) showed that years of 
education are not as closely related to test performance as general intellectual 
functioning. That is, test performance on Part A was more highly correlated with FSIQ 
(Pearson’s r = .368) than education (Pearson’s r = .174). Similarly, Part B performance 
was also more highly correlated with FSIQ (Pearson’s r = .495) than education 
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(Pearson’s r = .242). In relation to other measures, the Trail Making Test Part B has been 
found to be sensitive to measures of cognitive flexibility more so than ability to maintain 
set (Kortte, Horner, & Windham, 2002). That is, on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, 
percent of perseverative responses as opposed to failure to maintain set predicted 
performance on Trail Making Tests Part B.  
Cognitive Screening: Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et 
al., 2005). The MoCA is a 10-minute cognitive screening tool covering broad cognitive 
domains including: short-term memory recall, visual spatial abilities, executive functions, 
attention/concentration, language and orientation. More specifically, this screening tool 
includes two learning trials and delayed recall of five nouns, clock drawing, a three-
dimensional cube copy, phonemic fluency, verbal abstraction task, target detection using 
tapping, serial subtraction, confrontation naming, repetition, and orientation to time and 
place. According to Nasreddine et al., the MoCA has a high test-retest reliability (r = .92, 
p <.001), and good internal consistency (Cronbach alpha = 0.83). Education was found to 
affect performance, and it is recommended that 1 point is added for those with 12 or less 
years of education to correct for education effects. The authors recommended a cut-off 
score of 26/30 for the detection of mild cognitive impairment. However, more recent 
studies (e.g., et al., 2011) have shown that using a cut-off score of < 24/30 improves the 
specificity of the task (fewer false positives) without compromising the sensitivity of the 
task to identifying patients with mild cognitive impairment.     
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Table 2 
Tests and Test Scores 
Test  Scores Used   
Metaphor Interpretation Test Free response AC 
Free response AP 
Free response CT 
Free response OT 
Multiple Choice AC 
Multiple Choice AP 
Multiple Choice CT 
Multiple Choice OT 
 
Digit Span Test Total Score 
Total Digit Span Forward 
Longest Digit Span Forward 
Total Digit Span Backward 
Longest Digit Span Backward 
 
Sentence Repetition  Total Correct  
NAART35 Total Correct  
Trail Making Test  Part A Time 
Part A Errors 
Part B Time 
Part B Errors 
 
WASI-2  Matrix Reasoning Total Score 
Similarities Total Score 
 
Note.  All scores are raw scores. AC: Abstract Complete; AP: Abstract Partial; CT: 
Concrete; OT: Other; NAART35: North American Adult Reading Test (35-item); WASI-
2: Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (2nd ed.).  
Statistical Analysis 
All variables were examined and there were no missing data. The assumptions of 
the statistical analyses including linearity, independence, homoscedasticity, and 
normality were tested. Raw scores were used in all analyses, and data were analyzed 
using SPSS for Windows 17.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). For all analyses a two-
tailed p-value of <.05 was considered statistically significant. All effect size magnitude 
interpretations were based on Cohen (1988).  
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CHAPTER 4 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
  Preliminary analyses involved ascertaining age group differences on standardized 
neuropsychological measures and associations in performance between younger and 
older adults who were biologically related or friends.  In order to see whether participants 
showed the age group differences seen in the neuropsychological literature, age 
differences in performance on the neuropsychological measures also were examined 
using ANOVAs. Based on the literature reviewed above (Hasher & Zachs, 1988; 
Salthouse, 1990, 1993), it was expected that there would be age differences favouring 
younger adults on raw scores of working memory tests (Digit Span forward and 
backward, Sentence Repetition), processing speed (Trail Making Test: Part A), cognitive 
flexibility (Trail Making Test: Part B), visual-spatial abstract reasoning (Matrix 
Reasoning subtest), and verbal abstract reasoning (Similarities subtest). Age differences 
favouring older adults were expected for the raw scores on the North American Adult 
Reading Test.  
 As expected based on the aging literature, there were age differences favouring 
younger adults (See Table 3) on raw scores of the Sentence Repetition Test, the Trail 
Making Test: Part B, the Matrix Reasoning subtest, and the Similarities subtest. Results 
indicated that, on the neuropsychological measures sampled, the two groups performed as 
would be expected based on age-norms with the following exceptions. Contrary to 
expectation, older adults performed as well as (not better than) younger adults in terms of 
raw scores on the North American Adult Reading Test. Additionally, younger adults’ 
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performance was not significantly better than older adults on Trail Making Test: A or 
Digit Span Backwards. Age-corrected T scores for all measures were within the average 
range (T-score range = 48 to 52) for both older and younger adult sample. Therefore, 
there appeared to be no underlying differences in ability level between the two age 
groups 
Table 3 
Neuropsychological Test and Metaphor Interpretation Test Age Group Differences 
 
       Younger Adults 
            (n = 40) 
             Older Adults 
(n = 40) 
 
Measure M SD M SD 
 
Cohen’s d 
Digit Span Forward 10.80 1.94 9.92 2.23 0.42 
Digit Span Backward 6.90 2.23 6.90 2.20 0 
Matrix Reasoning* 21.18 3.38 19.08 4.59 0.52 
Similarities* 32.65 3.66 30.78 4.29 0.47 
Trail Making Test A^ 23.83 9.80 27.1 9.09 -0.35 
 
Trail Making Test 
B*^ 54.51 21.00 69.18 36.78 -0.49 
Sentence Repetition* 15.20 2.21 14.13 1.84 0.52 
NAART-35 17.33 6.54 18.15 7.75 -0.11 
MIT: FR AC 8.15 2.97 7.4 2.80 0.26 
MIT: FR AP 5.38 1.81 4.53 2.08 0.33 
MIT: FR CT* 1.00 0.99 2.35 1.56 -1.03 
MIT: FR OT 2.48 2.30 2.73 2.06 -0.11 
MIT: MC AC* 12.13 2.20 10.98 2.25 0.52 
MIT: MC AP 2.90 1.88 2.95 1.34 -0.03 
MIT: MC CT* 1.15 0.92 1.93 1.43 -0.78 
MIT: MC OT 0.78 0.92 1.15 1.08 -0.37 
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Note. MIT: Metaphor Interpretation Test; MC: FR: Free Response; Multiple Choice; AC: 
Abstract Complete; AP: Abstract Partial; CT: Concrete; OT: Other. *All significant 
differences favoured younger adults p < .05. ^Lower scores represent quicker 
performance in seconds.  
Hypothesis 1: Age differences on the Metaphor Interpretation Test 
 It was expected that older adults would provide more CT answers but fewer 
abstract answers than younger adults, and that these differences would be greater on the 
free response version of the test than the multiple choice version. To evaluate the 
different parts of this hypothesis, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted in order 
to examine age group differences in performance on the Metaphor Interpretation Test and 
interactions with test format. Age differences in AC, AP, CT, and OT responses were 
examined for the free response and multiple choice formats (with age group as the 
independent variable, scores as dependent variables, and the free response vs. multiple 
choice score as the within-subject repeated measure). 
As expected, older adults gave more concrete answers than younger adults, F (1, 
78) = 25.61, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -.84. Younger adults tended to provide more abstract 
complete responses, although this effect was not as strong, F (1, 78) = 3.951, p = .050, 
Cohen’s d = .37. Furthermore, it was confirmed that older and younger adults did not 
differ in their propensity to provide abstract partial responses, F (1, 78) = 1.81, p = .183, 
Cohen’s d = .22 or other unrelated responses, F (1, 78) = 1.01, p = .317, Cohen’s d = -
.19. It was found that participants were less likely to  come up with abstract complete 
responses in the Free Response than in the Multiple Choice format, F (1, 78) = 138.35, p 
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<.001. However, contrary to expectations, there was no interaction between age group 
and test format type, F (1, 78) = .388, p = .535 (see Figure 1).  
Overall, participants were no more likely to  produce concrete answers on the 
Free Response format than to choose concrete answers  on the multiple choice format,  F 
(1, 78) = .539, p = .465.  Moreover, the interaction between age group and test format 
type was not significant, F (1, 78) = 2.356, p = .129 (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. Number of Abstract Complete answers provided by younger and older adults in 
free response versus multiple choice formats.  
*
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Figure 2. Number of Concrete answers provided by younger and older adults in free 
response versus multiple choice formats.  
Hypothesis 2: Correlational Analyses 
 Based on Iskandar & Baird (2013), it was expected that tasks emphasizing 
working memory (the Digit Span scores and Sentence Repetition total score) would be 
associated with performance on the Metaphor Interpretation Test. It was also expected 
that scores on the multiple choice version of the test would be correlated with those on 
the free response version.  
Two-tailed Pearson correlations were computed in order to examine the relations 
between these neuropsychological measures and the relations between the 
neuropsychological measures and the metaphor interpretation task (listed in Table 2 
above). These correlations were examined separately for the two age-groups in order to 
see if there was a difference in these associations with age. 
*
*
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The expected findings were shown to some extent for older adults (see Table 4), 
and to a lesser extent for younger adults (see Table 5). That is, in older adults, significant 
correlations were seen between the Sentence Repetition score and free AC, AP, and OT 
responses as well as multiple choice AC, CT, and OT responses. Additionally, significant 
correlations were seen between the Digit Span Backward score and free AC, CT, and OT 
responses and multiple choice OT responses. In younger adults a significant correlation 
between the Sentence Repetition score and free CT responses was found.  
Table 4 
Correlations of Metaphor Interpretation Test Responses with Neuropsychological 
Measures in Older Adults (N = 40) 
 FR: AC FR: AP FR: CT FR: OT MC: AC MC: AP MC: CT MC: OT 
Matrix 
Reasoning 
.455** .122 -.272 -.534** .383* .034 -.399* -.309 
 
Similarities 
 
-.375* 
 
.227 
 
-.263 
 
-.537** 
 
.337* 
 
   .025 
 
-.372* 
 
-.237 
 
Digit Span 
Forward 
 
 
.251 
 
 
-.058 
 
 
.015 
 
 
-.294 
 
 
    .158 
 
 
.102 
 
 
-.193 
 
 
-.198 
 
Digit Span 
Backward 
 
 
 
.559* 
 
 
-.062 
 
 
-.347* 
 
 
-.559** 
 
 
.124 
 
 
.085 
 
 
.086 
 
 
-.480** 
Trail 
Making A 
 
 
-.100 
 
-.023 
 
-.194 
 
.110 
 
.295 
 
-.273 
 
-.074 
 
-.177 
Trail 
Making B 
 
-.402* 
 
.099 
 
.032 
 
-.374* 
 
.034 
 
-.179 
 
-.136 
 
.332* 
 
Sentence 
Repetition 
 
 
.711** 
 
 
-.326* 
 
 
-.287 
 
 
-.375* 
 
 
.453* 
 
 
-.060 
 
 
-.316* 
 
 
-.450* 
 
NAART35 
 
.472** 
 
.024 
 
.066 
 
-.262 
 
 
.293 
 
.066 
 
-.142 
 
-.508* 
Note. FR: Free Response format; MC: Multiple choice format; AC: Abstract Complete; 
AP: Abstract Partial; CT: Concrete; OT: Other. *p <.05, **p <.01 
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Table 5 
 
Correlations of MIT Response Types with Neuropsychological Measures in Younger  
 
Adults (N = 40) 
 
 FR: AC FR: AP FR: CT FR: OT MC: AC MC: AP MC: CT MC: OT 
Matrix 
Reasoning 
 
.148 
 
.044 
 
-.092 
 
-.186 
 
.263 
 
-.094 
 
-.025 
 
-.424** 
 
Similarities 
 
.147 
 
.230 
 
-.043 
 
-.351* 
 
.006 
 
.013 
 
.031 
 
-.016 
 
Digit Span 
Forward 
 
 
.095 
 
 
-.103 
 
 
-.107 
 
 
.005 
 
 
-.066 
 
 
.072 
 
 
.103 
 
 
-.012 
 
Digit Span 
Backward 
 
 
 
.014 
 
 
.041 
 
 
-.175 
 
 
.025 
 
 
.024 
 
 
-.064 
 
 
.182 
 
 
-.111 
Trail 
Making A 
 
 
-.240 
 
.290 
 
.058 
 
.056 
 
-.094 
 
-.026 
 
.241 
 
.081 
Trail 
Making B 
 
-.272 
 
-.031 
 
.355* 
 
.219 
 
-.078 
 
-.102 
 
.001 
 
.435** 
 
Sentence 
Repetition 
 
 
.210 
 
 
.128 
 
 
-.388* 
 
 
-.206 
 
 
-.021 
 
 
.110 
 
 
.023 
 
 
-.141 
 
NAART35 
 
.245 
 
-.113 
 
-.342* 
 
-.080 
 
-.212 
 
.245 
 
.158 
 
-.047 
Note. FR: Free Response format; MC: Multiple choice format; AC: Abstract Complete; 
AP: Abstract Partial; CT: Concrete; OT: Other. *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
Performance on the multiple choice format was consistently significantly 
positively correlated with performance in the free writing format in both age groups for 
the AC response score only. For both older and younger adults (see Table 6 and Table 7, 
respectively), there was a correlation between AC responses provided in free recall and 
on multiple choice. However, this finding did not extend to the other types of responses, 
because participants were likely to choose a different type of response on multiple choice 
(i.e., switch to a more complete response or abstract response) if they provided an AP, 
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CT, or OT response on free response. One exception to this was for OT responses in 
older adults. That is, older adults who gave OT free responses were also likely to choose 
OT responses on multiple choice.   
Table 6 
Correlations of MIT Response Types in Older Adults (N = 40) 
 MC: AC MC: AP MC: CT MC: OT FR: AC FR: AP FR: CT FR: OT 
MC: AC 1 -.529** -.603** -.624** .360* .063 -.275 -.344* 
MC: AP  1 -.175 .094 .040 .111 -.102 -.089 
MC: CT   1 .140 -.177 -.081 .195 .174 
MC: OT    1 -.566** -.163 .441** .597** 
FR: AC     1 -.408** -.555** -.527* 
FR: AP      1 -.114 -.367* 
FR: CT       1 .110 
FR: OT        1 
Note. MC: Multiple choice format; FR: Free Response format; AC: Abstract Complete; 
AP: Abstract Partial; CT: Concrete; OT: Other. *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
Table 7.  
Correlations of MIT Response Types in Younger Adults (N = 40) 
 MC: AC MC: AP MC: CT MC: OT FR: AC FR: AP FR: CT FR: OT 
MC: AC 1 -.866** -.288 -.328 .422** -.148 -.035 -.413** 
MC: AP  1 -.006 .031 -.333* .094 .028 .344* 
MC: CT   1 -.232 .029 -.004 -.085 .002 
MC: OT    1 -.298 .114 .000 .295 
FR: AC     1 -.518** -.403** -.710** 
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FR: AP      1 -.043 -.137* 
FR: CT       1 .057 
FR: OT        1 
Note. MC: Multiple choice format; FR: Free Response format; AC: Abstract Complete; 
AP: Abstract Partial; CT: Concrete; OT: Other. *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
Hypothesis 3: Regression Analyses 
In order to examine a wider spectrum of the abilities associated with performance 
on the Metaphor Interpretation Test (i.e., number of AC responses and CT responses), 
correlations between these scores and measures of basic short-term memory span, 
meaningful short-term memory span, executive working memory, verbal and visual-
spatial abstract thinking, processing speed, cognitive flexibility, and reading ability were 
computed. These abilities were operationalized as Forward Digit Span total, Sentence 
Repetition total, Backward Digit Span total, Similarities, Matrix Reasoning, Trail Making 
Test A, Trail Making Test B, and the North American Adult Reading Test, respectively. 
Auxiliary analyses were also conducted for number of AP responses and number of OT 
responses with the expectation that these types of responses would not be strongly 
associated with the neuropsychological measures.   
 Multiple regression analyses were performed using the enter method with 
number of AC responses, number of AP responses, number of CT responses, and number 
of OT responses as the dependent variables and all the neuropsychological test variables 
that showed a significant bivariate association for that specific age group (two-tailed at 
p<.05) with each response type score on the Metaphor Interpretation Test (e.g., the 
neuropsychological test scores that were significantly associated with the number of AC 
responses in multiple choice were included in that particular regression). Separate 
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regression analyses for older and younger adults were conducted because older and 
younger adults were expected to perform differently on the Metaphor Interpretation Test 
and the neuropsychological measures. Additionally, including both age groups in the 
same analyses would violate the independence of observations assumption of regression 
analysis, because older adults were family members or friends of the younger adults. 
These analyses were done separately for the Metaphor Interpretation Task–Free-response 
performance and the Metaphor Interpretation Test–Multiple-choice performance. 
For younger adults, regression analyses were performed for two Free Response 
types and one Multiple Choice response type. The free response types were CT responses 
and OT responses. The regression models were significant for both response types:  R2= 
.289, F (3, 36) = 3.561, p  = .007 and R2= .123, F (1, 38) = 5.354, p  = .026 respectively 
(see Table 8). The regression model for the multiple choice OT response type was also 
significant R2= .287, F (2, 37) = 7.231, p = .002 (see Table 9). 
Table 8 
Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Free Responses in Younger Adults (N =  
40) 
 
Concrete Response Types 
 
Measures   B B     T-Score      P-value 
Trail Making Test B .012 .252 1.707 .097 
Sentence Repetition -.143 -.323 -2.198 .035 
NAART35 -.031 -.206 -.206 .173 
 
Other/Unrelated Response Types     
Similarities -.221 -.351 -2.314 .026 
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Table 9 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Multiple Choice Responses in Younger 
Adults (N = 40) 
 
Other/Unrelated Response Types 
Measures   B B     T-Score      P-value 
Trail Making B .015 .343   2.334 .025 
Matrix Reasoning  -.086 -.325 -2.212 .033 
 
No regression models were analyzed for Multiple Choice – Abstract complete, 
Abstract Partial, or Concrete responses because no predictors were significantly 
correlated with these types of responses. Similarly, no regression models were analyzed 
for Free Response – Abstract Complete or Abstract Partial responses.  
For older adults, regression models for all response types were conducted, with 
the exception of those for Multiple Choice – AP responses, because no predictors were 
significantly correlated with this type of response. All regression models tested were 
statistically significant. That is, the regression model significantly predicted Free 
Responses that were Abstract Complete [R2= .699, F (6, 33) = 12.358, p  = < .001], 
Abstract Partial [R2= .106, F (1, 38) = 4.521, p  = .040], Concrete [R2= .120, F (3, 36) = 
5.203, p  = .028], and Unrelated/Other [R2= .500, F (5, 34) = 6.807, p  < .001, see Table 
10]; and Multiple Choice responses that were Abstract Complete [R2= .288, F (3, 36) = 
4.863, p  = .006], Concrete [R2= .230, F (3, 36) = 3.577, p  = .023], and Unrelated/Other 
[R2= .391, F (4, 35) = 5.458, p  = .002, see Table 11]  
Table 10 
 
Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Free Responses in Older Adults (N = 40) 
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Abstract Complete Response Type  
Measures   B B     T-Score      P-value 
Sentence Repetition .932 .614  5.311 <.001 
Digit Span Backward .523 .412  2.941 .006 
Trail Making Test B .003 .038 .311 .758 
NAART35 -.012 -.032 -.256 .800 
Matrix Reasoning .068 .111 .879 .386 
Similarities .017 .026 .212 .833 
 
Abstract Partial Response Type 
    
Sentence Repetition -.367 -.326 -2.126 .040 
 
Concrete Response Type  
    
Digit Span Backward -.246 -.347 -2.281 .028 
Other Response Type     
Digit Span Backward -.287 -.307  -1.954 .059 
Matrix Reasoning -.086 -.191  -1.230 .227 
Similarities -.123 -.256 -1.684 .101 
Trail Making Test B .003 .054 .363 .719 
Sentence Repetition -.205 -.183 -1.401 .170 
 
Table 11 
 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Multiple Choice Responses in Older Adults 
(N = 40) 
 
Abstract Complete Response Type 
Measures   B B     T-Score      P-value 
Matrix Reasoning .093 .190  1.094 .281 
Similarities  .080 .152 .897 .375 
Sentence Repetition .443 .363 2.458 .019 
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Concrete Response Type 
    
Similarities -.068 -.202   -1.146 .260 
Matrix Reasoning  -.071 -.226  -1.250 .220 
Sentence Repetition -.159 -.204 -1.328 .192 
 
Other Response Type  
Sentence Repetition -.164 -.281 -1.815 .078 
Digit Span Backward -.144 -.296 -1.660 .106 
Trail Making Test B .001 .024 .149 .883 
NAART35 -.032 -.226 -1.325 .194 
 
Hypothesis 4: Covariance Analyses  
It was predicted that (a) co-varying on the Sentence Repetition total score would 
eliminate any age group difference in number of AC responses and CT responses; and (b) 
co-varying with measures of estimated crystallized verbal intellectual abilities would 
increase the effect size in group differences between older and younger adults in AC 
responses and in CT responses. That is, that these difference may not be apparent until a 
measure of these abilities (NAART total score) is used as a covariate; because older 
adults with higher estimated verbal IQ would have theoretically have reserve that allows 
them to compensate for cognitive changes that would otherwise lead to more concrete 
thinking. 
Covariance analyses were conducted in order to attempt to explain the potential 
differences in metaphorical interpretation. Co-varying on Sentence Repetition Total 
scores (with test format as a repeated measure) was expected to eliminate the age-related 
differences in metaphorical interpretation, whereas co-varying on the NAART total score 
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was expected to augment these differences. As expected, co-varying on the Sentence 
Repetition total score eliminated the difference in AC responses between younger and 
older adults, F (1, 78) = 1.226, p = .272, suggesting that short-term memory span 
mediates the relationship between age group and abstract response production on the 
Metaphor Interpretation Test. There was also a response type by Sentence Repetition 
total interaction, whereby co-varying on sentence repetition eliminated the age difference 
in the free response  but not the multiple choice format, F (1, 78) = 6.566, p = .012 (see 
Figure 3 as compared to Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 3. Number of Abstract Complete answers provided by younger and older adults in 
free response versus multiple choice formats with Sentence Repetition Total score co-
varied.  
Supporting the second part of this hypothesis, co-varying with NAART35 score 
resulted in a medium effect of age on AC response production, F (1, 78) = 4.674, p = 
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.034, η2 = .06. The effect size without using the NAART35 as a covariate was small, η2 = 
.02. There was also a response format  by NAART35 score interaction, whereby 
NAART35 score augmented age group differences in the  free response but not the 
multiple choice format, F (1, 78) = 6.293, p = .014. Figure 4 shows this effect by 
comparing low (below average) and high (above average) scorers in the younger and 
older age groups.  
 
 
Figure 4. The effect of estimated premorbid verbal IQ (estimated by NAART35) on 
production of abstract complete responses on the MIT- free response. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Effects of Perceived Familiarity  
Although familiarity was not associated with performance in Iskandar & 
Baird(2013), it was thought that an age interaction between familiarity and performance 
was possible. In order to explore this possibility, interactions between familiarity score 
and age were examined when age group differences in number of AC responses were 
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observed. To do so, familiarity scores were used to divide the participants into a high 
familiarity group (those reporting above average familiarity with the metaphors) and a 
low familiarity group (those reporting below average familiarity with the metaphors). 
Within-subject repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted with age (older versus 
younger) and familiarity (high versus low) as the IVs and the number of AC responses as 
the dependent variable.  
There was no difference between average reported perceived familiarity (on a 1 to 
5 scale)  between the older adult and younger adult  groups, F (1, 78) = .712, p = .401.  
It was found that familiarity did not significantly affect number of AC responses 
on the Metaphor Interpretation Test, F (1, 78) = 2.254, p = .137, and there was no 
interaction between age group and familiarity, F (1, 78) = 0.111, p = .740 (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. The effect of perceived familiarity on abstract complete response production or 
selection (based on an aggregate of free response and multiple choice responses). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Discussion 
In this study, the Metaphor Interpretation Test (Iskandar & Baird, 2013), a test of 
abstract thinking and figurative language focusing on people’s understanding of 
metaphors, was further refined and evaluated. The first part of the test requires free 
responses explaining what metaphors mean, and the second part of the test requires 
participants to choose the best response amongst four options for each metaphor. This 
test, along with a number of neuropsychological measures, was administered to a group 
of younger adults and a group of older adults. The following research questions were 
addressed: whether older adults produced more concrete responses and fewer abstract 
responses than younger adults; whether older adults benefitted from the multiple choice 
format more  than younger adults; whether different neuropsychological measures 
predicted performance on the Metaphor Interpretation Test for older as compared to 
younger adults; whether age group differences in working memory capacity underlay the 
difference in abstract response production in older versus younger adults; whether older 
adults with higher crystallized verbal intelligence (and therefore more cognitive  reserve) 
showed a  curtailed age-related tendency towards producing more concrete responses; 
and whether perceived familiarity with the metaphors influences performance on the task  
and had a different effect for an older versus a younger age group  
Results indicated that older adults were more likely than younger adults to give 
concrete responses in a free response format and to choose concrete responses in a 
multiple-choice format. Older adults also chose fewer abstract complete responses on 
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multiple choice and freely provided fewer abstract complete responses than younger 
adults.  
Contrary to expectations, older and younger adults benefitted equally from the 
multiple choice format as compared to the free response format. Performance on free 
response versus multiple choice formats was predicted by different neuropsychological 
measures, and it is likely that the two formats of the test require somewhat different 
cognitive processes despite the fact that both technically are measures of metaphor 
interpretation.  In a way, this is not surprising, because the free response measure requires 
participants to mentally search for and retrieve a correct response, while the multiple 
choice measure only requires an evaluation of different responses (i.e., the participant 
only needs to recognize the response that they know is the best interpretation, rather than 
come up with it spontaneously). Measures of working memory, verbal and visual-spatial 
abstract thinking, reading ability, and cognitive flexibility were associated with the 
Metaphor Interpretation Test scores. Simple processing speed, however, appeared to 
clearly rely on a different domain of cognition unrelated to the thinking process required 
in producing abstract responses.  
There were more statistically significant bivariate correlations between 
neuropsychological and Metaphor Interpretation Test measures in older versus younger 
adults. As such older adults’ performance on the Metaphor Interpretation Test was more 
often predicted by neuropsychological measures than younger adults’ performance. That 
is, significant regression models were identified for free response AC, AP, CT, and OT 
responses as well as multiple choice AC, CT, and OT responses. Similar to previous 
findings with younger adults (Iskandar & Baird, 2013), short-term memory span for 
 83 
 
meaningful language, or working memory storage, was a reliable predictor of AC 
responses in an older adult sample. This finding was not replicated for younger adults in 
this study, possibly because of the exclusion of three metaphors that were in the previous 
study (making this version of the Metaphor Interpretation Test less sensitive for younger 
adults). Additionally, in older adults, the executive aspects of working memory were also 
a significant predictor of performance, with lower scores predicting more concrete 
responses. 
For younger adults, regression models significantly predicted free response CT 
and OT responses, and multiple choice OT responses. In younger adults, lower 
performance on mental flexibility predicted OT responses on multiple choice, lower 
working memory storage predicted CT responses on free response, and lower verbal 
abstraction abilities predicted OT responses on free response.  
As hypothesized, short-term memory span for meaningful language appeared to 
influence the difference between younger and older adults’ performance on the Metaphor 
Interpretation Test. Co-varying on a measure of sentence repetition eliminated the 
difference between younger and older adults in AC responses. Additionally, it was shown 
that age group differences in performance on the Metaphor Interpretation Test were also 
related to a measure of crystallized verbal ability expected to increase throughout 
adulthood (NAART35). Older adults did not rate the metaphors in the Metaphor 
Interpretation Test as more familiar than younger adults,. Perceived familiarity did not 
result in greater numbers of AC responses on the Metaphor Interpretation Test.  
As can be seen in Table 1, age group differences were found on a variety of 
cognitive abilities sampled including visual abstract problem solving (Matrix Reasoning); 
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verbal problem solving (Similarities); attention switching (Trail Making Test B); and 
short-term memory span, also referred to as storage component of working memory, for 
meaningful language (Sentence Repetition). Amongst this sample, there were no age-
related differences in short-term memory span for numbers (Digit Span Forward); mental 
manipulations, also referred to as the executive component of working memory (Digit 
Span Backward), processing speed (Trail Making Test A), or estimated premorbid verbal 
intelligence (NAART35). 
Overall the sample collected performed as expected based on age norms. That is, 
the younger adults in this study performed almost identically to adults aged 20-24 on 
Digit Span Total raw score, and the older adults performed almost identically to adults 
aged 66-64 in normative samples gathered for  the WAIS-III manual (Wechsler, 2008). 
The age differences noted on Matrix Reasoning and Similarities are also typical given 
age-based norms from the WASI-2 manual (Wechsler, 2012). High scores on Matrix 
Reasoning indicate well developed visual-spatial abstract reasoning; and although lower 
scores indicate rigid thinking, they may also reflect poor concentration (Groth-Marnat, 
2003) or lowered working memory capacity (Salthouse, 1993). Similarly, high scores on 
Similarities indicate well developed verbal abstract reasoning and concept formation, and 
although lower scores may indicate concreteness, they may also indicate poor verbal 
fluency (Groth-Marnat, 2003) or difficulties in retrieval of verbal information from long-
term memory (Lichtenberger & Kauffman, 2013).  
The Metaphor Interpretation Test was developed to provide a purer measure of 
concrete versus abstract thinking by separating retrieval difficulties from general inability 
to abstractly interpret information (by comparing scores on free response and multiple 
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choice formats). It also more clearly separates concreteness from general comprehension 
difficulties. By using the scoring system for free response, general comprehension 
difficulties would be coded as OT as compared to concreteness difficulties that would be 
coded as CT.  On the multiple choice version, concreteness is easily identified by 
participants’ choice of concrete options.  
On the Trail Making Test A, a processing speed measure, there surprisingly was 
no difference between the younger and older adults. The older adults in the present study 
outperformed those in the most recent normative studies of this test (Hester, Kinsella, 
Ong, & McGregor, 2005; Tombaugh, 2004). However, the older adult group in Hester et 
al. was considerably older than in this group (minimum age 60 years); and a comparable 
age-group from Tombaugh’s study had considerably fewer years of education (M = 13.59 
years) as compared to the average older adult (M = 15.22 years) in the present study. 
Formal educational attainment plays a role in processing speed, especially for adults over 
54 years (Tombaugh, 2003). For example, lower educated adults aged 18-24 performed 
comparably on Trail Making Test A to higher educated adults in the 70-74 age range 
(Tombaugh). On the other hand, there was a significant difference on Trail Making Test 
B, a measure of cognitive flexibility and set shifting, as expected based on age-norms. 
This suggests that processing speed measures that involve cognitive flexibility are more 
sensitive to age-related changes than simple processing speed measures.  
On Sentence Repetition, a measure of short-term memory span for meaningful 
language, there was a clear effect of age on performance favouring younger adults. This 
was in line with the original scoring of the test (see Gilbert, 1941), as well as the Spreen 
and Benton (1977) version, which allotted +1 extra points for adults between 35 and 44 
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years old and +2 extra points for adults between 45 and 64 years old; but not with other 
studies showing no age difference (Vargo & Black, 1984; Meyers, Volkert, & Diep, 
2000). Meyers et al. attributed these discrepant findings to differences in administration 
procedure, such as reading the stimuli rather than presenting them on tape. However, in 
the present study, stimuli were also read out and an age difference was still found. It is 
possible that the speed with which we read the material better reflected that used in the 
original study, whereas it was slower (presumably for both younger and older adults) in 
the other studies in order to accommodate for theoretical age-effects on processing speed. 
There was no age-group difference in the raw scores on the NAART35, which measures 
estimated verbal intelligence. The mean scores of both the younger adult and older adult 
group represented average verbal intelligence.  
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this study, it was found that the 
biggest age group related effect sizes were for the number of concrete answers provided 
on the free response version of the test and chosen on the multiple choice version of the 
test (see Table 1). Older adults were also less likely to choose an abstract complete 
response in the multiple-choice  format than were younger adults. These findings 
replicate those from a German language study on proverb comprehension using a 
multiple choice format test (Uekermann et al., 2008), and an English language study 
using a free response format test (Nippold et al., 1997). In fact, these findings also 
suggest that metaphor interpretation may be more sensitive to age-effects than proverb 
tests in that these differences (older adults producing and choosing more concrete 
responses than younger adults) are very much apparent at a young-old age (M age = 
56.44). In the study by Uekermann et al. differences in proverb interpretation were not 
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found in adults 40-59 years of age, but were only detected at ages 60+ (M age = 68.17). 
Similarly, in Nippold et al.’s study, differences did not reach statistical significance 
before age 70 years.  
Given the finding that co-varying with short-term memory span for meaningful 
information eliminated the age difference in performance, it appears that the ability to 
interpret metaphors is lowered with age as a result of a reduced working memory storage, 
or ability to hold, information. From a cognitive psychology perspective, it is well 
established that short-term memory span for meaningful information (or working 
memory capacity for language) can constrain comprehension of complex language (Just 
& Carpenter, 1992). When syntax is ambiguous, which was the case in many of the novel 
metaphors used in the Metaphor Interpretation Test, having a larger storage capacity for 
information permits one to maintain several different interpretations in mind. Hasher and 
Zacks (1988) refer to ambiguous syntactic structures as having high demands on working 
memory and thus as more likely affected by age.  
Another difference between younger and older adults is that concreteness in 
younger adults is consistently predicted by lower short-term memory span, or the storage 
component of working memory; whereas in older adults, concreteness in predicted by 
lower mental manipulation abilities, or the executive component of working memory as 
well short-term memory span. This finding may be related to the compensation 
hypothesis of neurocognitive aging. Simply stated, when older adults find a task more 
difficult, they are more likely to recruit different cognitive networks in order to come up 
with a response (for a review of this hypothesis, see Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008). 
This hypothesis has been shown to be especially relevant in working memory tasks. That 
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is, the higher working memory loading, the more likely it is for older adults to show 
greater activation in different brain networks (prefrontal, parietal, medial, and occipital) 
than younger adults as well as more bilateral activation as compared to left-lateralized 
activation in younger adults (Schneider-Garces et al., 2010). The fact that working 
memory is not easily localized mirrors the fMRI findings on figurative language 
reviewed in the introduction. In the present study, the compensation hypothesis can also 
explain why more regression models were significant for older adults than younger adults 
overall.  
Unlike short-term memory span for meaningful verbal information, which was 
lower in older compared to younger adults, verbal intelligence as estimated by the 
NAART35 was not statistically significant across groups. Verbal intelligence was 
strongly associatedwith free response production of abstract complete responses in older 
adults and weakly associated in younger adults. Based on theories of cognitive reserve, it 
was predicted and found that co-varying with estimated verbal intelligence augmented 
the difference between younger and older adults in free production of abstract complete 
responses. This suggested that adults with greater intellectual resources (cognitive 
reserve) do not show the same age-related declines as those with lower premorbid 
abilities. These findings are encouraging in that they highlight that age-related cognitive 
decline is not necessarily a universal or pervasive process. That is, there is great 
intraindividual variability within older adults (for review of this literature, see Hultsch, 
Strauss, Hunter, MacDonald, & Stuart, 2008) in terms of their cognitive abilities as well 
as how they perceive themselves as they age. Secondly, these findings allow for the idea 
that these changes may be preventable or reversible. They may be preventable in the 
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sense that adults who incorporate lifelong learning into their daily lives will likely have a 
greater verbal knowledge reserve which can continue to grow or at least stabilize with 
age (for theoretical overview see Sternberg, 2008). There are also differences in how 
older adults adapt to cognitive declines. Plasticity theories predict that adaptation to 
atrophy in prefrontal regions may involve network restructuring that can lead to 
equivalent functional performance in day-to-day life (for review of this literature, see 
Greenwood, 2007). 
In terms of familiarity, older adults did not report being more familiar with the 
metaphors than younger adults unlike what was shown in the proverbs study by 
Uekermann et al. (2008). [This suggests that the metaphors in this study were novel 
(average ratings were 2.6 on a 5-point scale)] and performance on the Metaphor 
Interpretation Test is less likely to be a measure of crystallized knowledge. Furthermore, 
the finding that younger adults provided more abstract responses than older adults despite 
no difference in familiarity suggests that there is more to metaphor interpretation than 
salience.  
Results of the present study suggest that alternating attention, as measured by 
Trail Making Test B, plays a role in choosing the best metaphor interpretation when four 
alternatives must be considered, and more specifically in the avoidance of choosing a 
clearly incorrect (unrelated/other) interpretation on multiple-choice (see Tables 7 and 9). 
This suggests that when individuals encounter a metaphor that they do not immediately 
understand, the ability to alternate attention is important in switching or shifting one’s 
focus from a seemingly correct interpretation that is actually neither literally or 
figuratively true to one that is more appropriate. These findings add a level of complexity 
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not addressed in Iskandar & Baird (2013), which suggested that the computational model 
of language processing can be applied to the understanding of metaphors. The 
computational model and other theories of figurative language comprehension have 
focused on the processes involved in the correct interpretation of metaphors. An 
incorporation of error analysis can shift this focus to understanding erroneous 
interpretation of metaphors and the breakdowns in cognitive processes that can lead to 
this (such as faltering alternating attention). Given the results of the present study, it is 
posited that if literal and figurative processing occur in parallel networks, a process 
responsible for switching attention between the two levels of interpretation is necessary 
for prevention of erroneous/unrelated responses. 
 Further research questions in this area remain unanswered. For example, 
in this study, the same sample received the multiple choice format following the free 
response. Although this was necessary in order to compare the formats of testing within 
subjects, future research may use different samples to evaluate the multiple choice format 
as a stand-alone measure. In addition, neuroimaging, which was not a part of this study, 
is an area for future research. That is, although behavioural data can provide clues as to 
the neurocognitive processes involved, a modification of this study for fMRI would more 
clearly delineate the functional neuroanatomy involved in the abstract interpretation, 
concrete interpretation, and other/unrelated interpretation of the Metaphor Interpretation 
Test items.  
Future studies may also involve assessing language skills in a functional manner. 
That is, although older adults provided less abstract and more concrete interpretations, it 
is not necessarily the case that these difficulties arise for them in daily life. Correlating 
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performance on the Metaphor Interpretation Test with interpretation of figurative 
language from a news article or a conversation would add further credence to its 
ecological validity. 
Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study, age-related results may be better 
framed as age group differences because there may be  cohort effects that may have 
interfered with performance in addition to age-related changes. However, by recruiting 
mainly biological relatives in the older and younger groups, who also had similar levels 
of education, I may have reduced some of the social, cultural, and economicdifferences 
that may be confounded with age differencesin typical cross-sectional studies. 
There are many potential applications of this project. In addition to highlighting 
age-differences, the Metaphor Interpretation Test theoretically can be applied to help with 
the differential diagnosis and treatment planning of a number of clinical presentations. In 
having both free response and multiple choice components and a scoring system that 
clearly differentiates different response types, it can be posited that this test can 
differentiate abstract from concrete thinking, and concrete thinking from retrieval or 
expressive difficulties. That is, in future research, the scores can potentially differentiate 
among the following profiles: good expressive abilities with abstract thinking, good 
expressive abilities with concrete thinking, poor expressive abilities with abstract 
thinking, and poor expressive abilities with concrete thinking.  
Theoretically, these profiles may be linked to different clinical disorders. For 
example, in Alzheimer’s disease, delayed memory is the best predictor of early stages, 
whereas examining lexical-semantic processing is important in determining whether 
progression to later stages has occurred (Welsh, Butters, Hughes, Mohs, & Heyman, 
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1992). Therefore, one might expect good expressive abilities with abstract thinking at the 
early stages; poor expressive ability, or retrieval, with abstract thinking intact at the 
moderate stages; and poor expressive ability with concrete thinking at the later stages. In 
an Italian language test of metaphors, Papagno (2001) found no differences between 
healthy older adults and those with early stage Alzheimer’s disease. On the other hand, 
mental rigidity and inflexibility with language disorder is a hallmark of frontotemporal 
dementia (the Lund and Manchester groups (1994). Therefore, as opposed to early stage 
Alzheimer’s, patients with frontotemporal dementia are expected to show poor expressive 
ability with concrete thinking. Patients with Parkinson’s disease are thought to have 
difficulties in working memory storage (short-term memory span), as well as planning 
and allocation of attentional resources (Dubois & Pillon, 1996). Therefore, these patients 
are expected to have difficulty generating abstract complete responses. In fact, Monetta & 
Pell (2007) showed that patients with Parkinson’s disease with a working memory 
storage impairment had difficulty understanding metaphors whereas those with intact 
working memory storage did not.  
Potentially, the use of the Metaphor Interpretation Test  also can be extended to 
developmental neuropsychological disorders. For example, in Down syndrome, a 
neuropsychological profile showing motor, language (morpho-syntax), verbal short-term 
memory span, and explicit long-term memory impairments, with relative preservation of 
implicit long-term memory is seen (Vicari, 2006). In an Italian language case study, 
Papagno and Vallar (2001) showed that a woman with Down syndrome performed within 
normal limits on a task of literal language comprehension but within the impaired range 
on a task of metaphor comprehension. Theoretically, such patients are expected to 
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produce poor expression with concrete thinking on the Metaphor Interpretation Test. In 
autism, neuropsychological impairments include motor imitation, divided attention, and 
response to emotional stimuli (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, & Rinaldi, 1998). In high 
functioning autism, patients are expected to show normal expression with concrete 
thinking.  
Children with language based learning disabilities tend to be a heterogeneous 
group with phonological awareness being the only ability that is reliably impaired 
(Fletcher et al., 1994). However, several studies have shown some degree of impairment 
in figurative language in this population (e.g., Jones & Stone, 1989; Lee & Kamhi, 1990; 
Nippold & Fey, 1983). Due to the heterogeneous nature of learning disabilities, there is 
little theoretical basis for predicting the pattern of impairment  on the Metaphor 
Interpretation Test; however, knowing the profile may be helpful on a case by case basis. 
Future research may also show a pattern for a particular learning disability type or 
subtype.  
The Metaphor Interpretation Test also may be  useful in psychiatric disorders. In 
schizophrenia, the neuropsychological profile is characterized by generalized thought 
disorder with severe impairments in episodic memory and executive control processes 
(Reichenberg & Harvey, 2007). In a French language study of free response metaphor 
interpretation, patients with schizophrenia made more errors (not differentiated) than 
patients with depression (Iakimova et al., 2006). Given this it would be expected that 
patients with schizophrenia are more likely to produce and choose unrelated/other 
responses on the Metaphor Interpretation Test. Overall, the Metaphor Interpretation Test 
provides a measure of a specific type of figurative language, with two formats, and a 
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comprehensive scoring system allowing for varied, practical, and theoretically informed 
future applications. 
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Appendix A 
General Scoring Guidelines 
AC (Abstract Complete)  – provides a full explanation of the metaphor, using a super-
ordinate category that is pertinent for both the vehicle and topic of the metaphor. 
 
AP (Abstract Partial) – provides an abstract explanation that is incomplete; or uses a 
super-ordinate category that is correct but less pertinent to both the topic and the vehicle 
 
CT (Concrete) – provides a response that is indicative of concrete thinking (e.g., 
concentrates on physical similarities when a pertinent functional similarity is present; 
provides a literally true statement that does not explain the similarity). 
 
OT (Other) – Clearly wrong responses, but not evidently due to concreteness  
 
If more than one response is given, use the full response if it is part of the same 
idea/explanation and use the last response if it is a new idea/explanation. 
 
1. The mind is a sponge  
 
AC – the mind absorbs/ /soaks up/takes in/sucks in information/knowledge/facts 
 – “can absorb a lot of information”  
 – “the mind can soak in a lot if information” 
 – “mind is able to absorb a variety of things and remember them when needed. 
 
AP – answer does not fully explain the relationship between the two elements; does not 
use above keywords; retains; holds 
 – “the mind can hold as much information as you feed it 
– “there is great retention of knowledge in our mind” 
 
CT– interprets metaphor literally 
– “the mind has holes” 
– “the mind can be subjected to pressure and capable of changing size or shape” 
 
OT – misinterprets the metaphor, but not due to concreteness 
 – “the mind is interesting” 
 – “nothing sticks when learning or trying to remember” 
 
2. Faithful love is a tree standing through the stormiest hour 
 
AC– mentions withstands/overcomes/work through/lasts through/make it 
through/conquers/remains/stand against/endures difficult situations 
– “faithful love is love that endures everything and doesn’t leave you or is very 
strong when difficulties come” 
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 – “faithful love remains through good and bad”  
 – “faithful love is one that can withstand anything that comes its way” 
 
AP – answer does not fully explain the metaphor, does not use above key words 
 – “faithful love is a strong kind of love” 
 – “still in love even through hard times” 
 – “it will still be there when the storm is over (a fight)” 
 
CT– interprets metaphor literally 
 – “Love is like a tree which provides shelter” 
 – “it is at a standstill” 
 – “it has roots deep in the ground” 
 
OT – misinterprets the metaphor, but not due to concreteness  
 – “love can be tough, just as a storm can be on a tree” 
 – “faithful love is very difficult to achieve” 
 
3. A butterfly is a winged rainbow 
 
AC –mentions colourful 
 – “filled with colours” 
 – “a butterfly is colourful” 
 – “a butterfly is as beautiful and colourful as a rainbow, but it also flies” 
 
AP – mentions only a secondary property – beautiful; rare 
 – “both beautiful” 
 – “butterflies are a beautiful part of nature” 
 
CT – literally true statement, incorrect interpretation. 
 – “both are in the sky” 
 – “both hard to catch (or impossible)” 
 
OT – irrelevant explanations 
– “a rainbow has the ability to come from something smaller as a butterfly 
appears from a cocoon from a caterpillar” 
– “life is about growing and trying new things” 
– “creations” 
 
4. A rabbit's fur in winter is a soldier's army green uniform in a jungle 
 
AC – mentions camouflage; blending into the environment; hide from predators 
 –“needed to survive, used as camouflage”  
 – “a rabbit’s fur helps it blend into the environment” 
– “the rabbit’s fur camouflages it to match the colour of the snow to hide it from 
predators” 
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AP – mentions protection (but not from weather) 
 – “both protect and serve their purpose in times of need” 
 – “protection from danger” 
 –“the colour of a rabbit’s fur can be used to protect it from predators” 
 
CT – mentions a similarity, without mention of purpose; mentions a concrete purpose; 
describes a concrete feature of only one of the items. 
 – “keeps you warm” 
 – “a rabbit’s fur in winter is green” 
 – “a rabbit’s fur in the winter is its protection from the cold” 
 
OT – irrelevant 
 – “it’s meant for conventional use” 
 – “people should suffer for one another” 
 – “a rabbit’s fur is as natural to him as a uniform is to a soldier.” 
 
6. The stars are signposts 
 
AC – mentions guide, point/lead/show the way, provide direction; you can navigate using 
them 
– “the stars are useful in helping guide someone along the way or through a path”   
– “the stars can be used for navigation” 
 – “we can navigate ourselves by the stars”  
 
AP – shows abstraction but unclear or does not use above keywords, uses above 
keywords incorrectly 
 – “stars are like a map to the sky” 
 – “the stars are arranged in a way that can help us find where we are.” 
 – “stars are directions” 
 
CT – mentions a literally true but irrelevant fact, mentions astrology/signs/omens 
 – “looks like stop signs and other signs” 
 – “they guide through darkness” 
 –“stars are signs that the universe is huge” 
 
OT – irrelevant statement 
 – “a guide is close by” 
 – “the gateway to great things like the universe or discovering self” 
 
7. A tree is an umbrella 
 
AC – mentions shields, guards, covers, protects from the rain/sun; provides shade, 
shelter, protection 
 – “a tree provides shelter from the rain” 
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 – “a tree will protect someone/thing from rain or sun” 
 – “a tree covers you from the rain” 
 
AP – mentions a secondary function: provides shadow, blocks things, canopy, keep you 
out; uses keyword unclearly 
 – “a tree provides shadow to the people in the sunlight” 
– “tree is like an umbrella, you go under a tree when it’s raining or when it’s 
really sunny” 
 – “it can keep the rain away” 
  
CT – concentrates on the shape/look 
 – “many things have the same shape” 
 – “a tree looks like an umbrella” 
– “a tree is long like an umbrella and has an opening at the top of it. It is also 
circular looking at the top” 
 
OT – irrelevant non-concrete statement 
 – “all branches working together in a cohesive process” 
 
8. Snow is winter's robes 
 
AC – mention covers/blankets/coats/dresses  
 – “snow covers the ground like a robe covers a person” 
 – “snow coats the ground in the winter like a robe coats a person” 
 – “snow blankets the earth in winter as a person putting a robe on” 
 
AP – mentions protection; an abstract interpretation that doesn’t use above keywords (or 
uses them as a noun). 
– “plants need protection from the harsh cold of winter and snow provides a robe 
of warmth to the plants/ecosystem like a person in a cold home” 
– “snow is the outer later. If winter was a person, that person would be draped 
with snow” 
– “winter wears snow. It’s found all over the rolling hills and streets, flowing like 
a robe” 
 
CT – a literally true but incorrect interpretation, a literal reiteration of the metaphor 
 – “snow is accompanied by winter” 
 – “indication of winter season” 
 – “snow keeps winter warm” 
 
OT – mentions irrelevant function 
 – “they are both soft” 
 – “snow is the shield against winter’s cold temperatures” 
 – “white snow is wet” 
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9. Love is a flower 
 
AC – mentions blooms/grows/blossoms 
 – “like a flower, love takes time to grow and bloom between two people” 
 – “love starts small and grows” 
 – “love needs nurturance and care for it to grow” 
  
AP – mentions a non-functional property, does not include above keywords.  
 – “love is beautiful” 
 – “love the emotion is beautiful as a glower created in nature” 
– “love is delicate and beautiful like a flower, and love needs to be taken care of 
by putting in time, like a flower needs”  
 
CT – a literally true statement that inaccurately explains the metaphor; mentions a 
property of flowers not applicable to love (fragrant) 
 – “you give flowers to someone you love” 
– “it is nice and smells good” 
– “it is beautiful, loses petals.” 
 
OT – unclear meaning 
 – “picked to find the right one” 
 – “if you take care and pay attention if not it dies” 
 
10. Genes are blueprints 
 
AC– mentions that they dictate/determine/lay out/map out how something will turn out  
–“blueprints are required in building any structure; they tell exactly how the 
structure will look like before it’s done. Genes also serve as the substance that 
determines how a living thing will look or turn out.” 
– “genes determine an individual’s make up physically, mentally, etc.” 
– “they determine what the person will be like” 
 
AP– mentions that they make up; they are maps; does not use above keywords 
 – “genes make up the body” 
– “they identify traits of the person” 
– “they tell us about where we come from” 
 
CT – a literal interpretation of blueprints 
 –“genes are like the blueprints for a building, then you can design and decorate.” 
 – “it shows how to build something” 
 – “genes are designed by an architect” 
 
OT– an inaccurate statement; a descriptor that only applies to genes or blueprints; 
hereditary 
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 – “genes don’t predict everything” 
 – “genes are stronger” 
 – “genes can tell you what’s wrong.. problems you have” 
 
11. The stars are fireflies 
 
AC – mentions that they light up /blink/flicker/twinkle/sparkle/give off light (*verb) at 
night 
 – “they twinkle in the night sky” 
 – “stars twinkle and shine in the dark” 
 – “both sparkle in the dark” 
 
AP – mentions they are bright, uses light (*noun), mentions a function of stars that is less 
specific than above keywords, mentions a more permanent state (e.g. shine, glow) 
 – “the stars are bright in the night like fireflies” 
 – “the stars shine in the dark” 
 – “in the dark, fireflies are nothing but little specks of light... just like stars” 
 
CT – a literally true statement that does not specifically address the similarity in the 
metaphor, focus on size 
 – “when you put a fire they look like stars. You see them everywhere” 
 – “stars look tiny” 
 
OT – irrelevant  
 – “grasp attention” 
 – “happiness is attainable” 
 
12. A pimple is the skin's volcano 
 
AC – mentions erupts/explodes/bursts/ruptures/blasts/emits  
– “a pimple is a skin’s volcano because it is a mound that contains a substance 
that will burst out just like a volcano contains lava and it is also a mound on the 
earth” 
– “a pimple is an eruption waiting to happen” 
– “a pimple is ready to erupt puss like a volcano and lava” 
 
AP – mentions that pimples are unwanted/disruptive/problematic, comes out, correct but 
without above keywords 
 – “a pimple happens when something bad needs to go out” 
 – “a pimple is a disaster to the skin” 
 – “a pimple emits substance from the skin as volcano emits magma from the earth 
core” 
  
CT – shows evidence of concrete thinking (focus on shape/colour without containing 
substance/potential for eruption), use explosion/eruption incorrectly, a literally true but 
unrelated property of pimples  
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 – “a pimple looks like a volcano” 
 – “a pimple can cause people to explode”  
 – “can stand out on the skin like a volcano does in a geographic region” 
 
OT – unrelated 
 – “no matter how small something is, it is still important” 
-- “pimples are normal” 
 – “a sign of something wrong in the skin” 
 
13. Hard work is a ladder 
 
AC – mentions that hard work improves/lifts up/moves up; can get you to higher 
levels/places/to the top/  
 – “the harder you work, the higher you go” 
 – “with hard work you improve upward” 
 – “hard work will eventually lead to the top” 
 
AP – abstract statement that does not fully explain the metaphor or is overly specific; 
does not use keywords above but describes getting somewhere better, success 
– “success is given to those who work hard” 
– “the harder you work, the higher you get on the payscale” 
 – “hard work is a way to succeed” 
 
CT – interprets the metaphor literally; literally true statement, but inaccurate 
interpretation 
 – “hard work takes climbing many rungs (or overcoming many steps in life)” 
 – “as a ladder, you start very easily and as you climb you get tired and it’s harder” 
 – “work gets harder and harder each step one takes in their career” 
 
OT – irrelevant explanations 
– “the more you work, the more you want to work” 
– “you need to keep persevering in life” 
 – “hard work isn’t easy. It’s a process and needs perseverance.” 
 
14. Education is a lantern 
 
AC– mentions that education sheds light/brightens/illuminates/enlightens/shines/lights up 
the way/path/future/life/mind 
– “education can light up your life” 
– “education sheds light to your path, guides you and opens up many options for 
you” 
 – “education can illuminate one’s life” 
 
AP – abstract statement that does not fully explain the metaphor; does not use keywords 
above; guides 
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– “being educated is to not be in the dark about certain things” 
– “when you learn, things become clear” 
– “education guides us towards a better life” 
 
CT – interprets the metaphor literally; literally true statement, but inaccurate 
interpretation 
 – “won’t be scared of being alone” 
– “education is light that enables you see clearly in the dark” 
– “you have to light up the lantern, you have to work hard in school to light up the 
lantern” 
  
OT – irrelevant explanations 
 – “can be used or not, it’s up to you” 
 – “only those who wield the lantern will be shown the way ahead” 
 – “education continues forever and you are always learning” 
 
15. An autumn’s storm is the funeral song of a dying year 
 
AC – mentions signals/signifies/indicates/marks/represents/reflects/symbolizes the end of 
the year/summer is over; shows that the year is coming to an end/over 
– “autumn signifies the end of a year, so the noises made in autumn can represent 
its death” 
 –“an autumn’s storm is the event that marks the near end of the year” 
– “autumn marks the end (funeral) of the summer; the year is getting closer to 
being over (dying) just like a funeral marks the ends of life.” 
 
AP – mentions end of the year without above keyword; mentions that it signals something 
but not the end of the year 
 – “autumn is the end of the year” 
 – “autumn is the last season before winter... winter is the dead season” 
– “the year is almost over” 
 
CT– a literally true fact that is related to the metaphor, but incorrect 
 – “a funeral consists of many tears” 
– “the end of fall heading into winter can be very depressing” 
 – “an autumn’s storm removes all leaves from the trees” 
 
OT – a unrelated response, incorrect interpretation 
 – “killing something so beautiful” 
 – “this is when the world starts anew” 
 – “the season of acceptance and letting go” 
 
16. A judge is a balance 
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AC – mentions that a judge 
/considers/weighs/measures/mediates/determines/sees/evaluates all/both/two views/ sides 
(of the story/argument)/the evidence before coming to a decision;  
– “a balance measures the weight of two objects to see which side weighs more or 
falls even between, a judge must consider both sides of a story to see which side 
is weaker and which has more weight”  
– “a judge must weigh two opposing views in court and decide which one is 
correct and which is not (to decide who is guilty) 
– “a judge’s role is to weigh what information is given to him/her and to provide 
an objective ruling” 
 
AP – abstract statement that does not fully explain the metaphor; does not use keywords 
above; a judge decides; mentions a primary shared property: 
unbiased/neutral/objective/fair/not predisposed to one side 
– “a judge is fair and unbiased or neutral” 
– “a balance and a judge are not (supposed to be) predisposed to one side or the 
other” 
– “a judge decides who gives the best argument” 
  
CT – interprets the metaphor literally 
– “a judge creates balance” 
– “the judge tries to balance good and bad somewhere in the middle” 
– “a judge is a balance between what is fair and what is just” 
 
OT – irrelevant explanations 
 – “a judge sustains” 
 – “a judge must keep things equal” 
 – “knows good and evil” 
 
17. Alcohol is a crutch 
 
AC – mentions that alcohol can be something you lean/latch/depend/rely on. 
 – “alcohol doesn’t fix problems, but it’s something to lean on” 
 – “some people use alcohol to deal with their problems and rely on it to function” 
– “alcohol is like a crutch in the sense that some will lean on it and depend on it to 
help support them when times become difficult” 
 
AP – abstract statement that does not fully explain the metaphor; does not use keywords 
above. Mentions another valid reason people use alcohol to cope 
 – “this refers to how some use alcohol to overcome hardship in life” 
– “this is saying that alcohol is used by some for help; it can give them help in 
times of need” 
– “people use alcohol to handle difficult or stressful situations, to perform or 
cope.” 
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CT – interprets the metaphor literally; literally true statement, but inaccurate 
interpretation 
 – “alcohol makes you fall” 
 – “alcohol make you dizzy and unstable. Can handicap temporarily” 
 – “comparing alcohol to a disability” 
 
OT – irrelevant explanations, harmful effects of alcohol 
– “alcohol can hurt you a lot if you allow it to” 
– “alcohol can cause hurt in people and damage lives. Alcohol can bring people to 
their worst” 
 – “bad” 
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Appendix B 
Demographics Questionnaire 
1. What is your primary language (language you are most proficient in/use most often) 
for: 
a. Reading/Writing: ________________ 
b. Speaking: ____________ 
 
2. How many years of education have you accumulated (e.g., high school diploma  = 12 
years)? ____ 
 
3. What is your age? ___ 
 
4. Have you been diagnosed with a psychiatric illness (e.g., Schizophrenia, Bipolar 
Disorder)? ____ 
 
5. Have you been diagnosed with a neurological illness (e.g., Multiple Sclerosis, 
Stroke)? ____ 
 
6. Have you experienced a brain injury? ____ 
 
7. What is your relationship to your co-participant? _____ 
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